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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jill Peterson and Kevin Heinz got married in a Minnesota church 
and made a video of the wedding party dancing down the aisle to 
“Forever” by Chris Brown.1  A video of this very entertaining march 
 
* S.J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I am grateful to Prof. Gideon 
Parchomovsky for invaluable contributions and encouragement.  I further thank Prof. Tim Wu and 
Prof. Kenneth Crews, Prof. Edward Lee, Dr. Shmuel Becher, and the participants of the SJDs 
workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for insightful comments and suggestions.  
Special thanks are also due to Ohad Lev-Aretz, Erez Aloni, Maayan Filmar, Luke Aneka and Nizan 
Geslevich-Pakin for their useful remarks.  I would also like to thank the ISEF Foundation for their 
generosity and support, which made this project possible. The opinions addressed in this Article are 
solely those of the author.   
 1. JK Wedding Entrance Dance, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JK_Wedding_Entrance_Dance (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
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was uploaded to YouTube as the “JK Wedding Entrance Dance.”2  
Assuming that neither the happy couple nor their friends obtained a 
copyright license to use Brown’s song, it is somewhat befuddling that it 
has been over eighteen months, in which more than 61 million users 
have viewed this video, yet it has not been removed from YouTube.  It is 
even more puzzling given the fact that this video is one of myriad 
examples of unauthorized uses of copyrighted content on user-generated 
content platforms.   
The emergence of the Web 2.0 phenomenon has challenged 
existing copyright practice by offering users an opportunity to engage in 
activities previously reserved for professionals only and to distribute 
content to an inconceivable amount of people through User-Generated 
Content (“UGC”) platforms.3  While users have utilized this 
advancement to share many original works, UGC platforms are saturated 
with infringing content, either in the form of derivative works or as pure 
reproductions of copyrighted works.4  Nonetheless, and although 
platforms and end-users are exposed to copyright infringement suits, 
UGC platforms are remarkably prosperous in cyberspace.   
Two developments in copyright practice, which have materialized 
as a response to the challenges posed by the Web 2.0 era, have allowed 
the outstanding success of UGC platforms.  The first development, 
which has been already recognized in legal commentary, is tolerated use.  
Tolerated use occurs when a copyright owner knows about infringing 
activity but does not act to halt it or seek to be compensated for it.5  This 
Article claims that although tolerated use is fairly widespread in the 
UGC context,6 it cannot, by itself, explain the undisturbed presence of 
countless copyrighted works posted by users.  The second advancement, 
 
 2. JK Wedding Entrance Dance, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-
94JhLEiN0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 3. The term Web 2.0 refers to collaborative, user-generated content space, which uses the 
Internet as a software platform.  See Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, Design Patterns and Business 
Models for the Next Generation of Software, O’REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), 
http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html.  UGC is often defined as content uploaded 
and sometimes created by Internet users, rather than produced by the website itself.  For a 
comprehensive definition, see Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of 
Copyright: Part one—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 870 (2008).   
 4. Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated 
Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 846-60 (2009).   
 5. Prof. Tim Wu, coined the term “tolerated use.”  Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 617, 619 (2008) [hereinafter Wu, Tolerated Use].   
 6. Id.  See also Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1459, 1506 (2008) (arguing that informal copyright practices serve as significant gap-fillers in 
copyright law and referring to a range of reasons that have allowed UGC to thrive, including 
outright ratification of mass user practices).   
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which I term “Second Level Agreements,” has yet to be analyzed in 
depth by legal commentary, although it holds the key to the resolution of 
the said puzzle.   
Second Level Agreements are preemptive licenses granted by 
copyright owners to platforms operators, with the purpose of ratifying 
the mass usage of copyrighted content by their users.  Under such 
arrangements, copyright owners authorize the employment of particular 
works by platforms’ users in return for royalties, company stakes, or a 
share of advertising revenues.  Many UGC networks, such as YouTube, 
Myspace, and Yahoo, have chosen this course to shelter themselves from 
secondary liability claims.  The first Second Level Agreement was 
concluded in 2006, when YouTube announced a video distribution and 
revenue partnership with Warner Music Group.7  According to 
YouTube’s press release, under the “first-of-its-kind arrangement, 
YouTube users will be able to incorporate music from WMG’s recorded 
music catalog into the videos they create and upload onto YouTube.”8   
While licenses for the purpose of pure reproduction are common in 
copyright practice,9 these agreements mark the first time in copyright 
history that a user creates a derivative work pursuant to a license that 
was not granted directly to her.  Because the agreements are negotiated 
and concluded between copyright holders and UGC platforms’ owners, 
users end up employing copyrighted works under the terms of a license 
they were neither a part of designing, nor were fully aware of its details.  
Users can gather information as to the terms of these agreements only 
from the few press releases and the media.  Moreover, users are legally 
bound only by the platforms’ terms of service, which do not reflect the 
existence of Second Level Agreements.10  Therefore, while in practice 
Second Level Agreements allow copyrighted materials posted by users 
on UGC platforms to remain online, the agreements should have no legal 
impact on the users’ legal status.   
This Article analyzes in-depth a significant practice that has not 
been recognized in legal scholarship.  Their unique structure and the way 
in which Second Level Agreements have developed within the relatively 
 
 7. Press Release, Warner Music Inc., Warner Music Group, Warner Music Group and 
YouTube Announce Landmark Video Distribution and Revenue Partnership (Sept. 18, 2006), 
http://investors.wmg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=182480&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=906153.   
 8. Id.   
 9. For example, when a user purchases a track on iTunes, she is allowed to export, burn (if 
applicable), or copy (if applicable) the sound recording solely for personal, noncommercial use.  See 
iTunes Store Terms of Service, Section 10(b)(vii), APPLE INC., 
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html#SERVICE (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 10. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.   
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short time of their existence have important consequences for the various 
players in the copyright market.  Accordingly, this study presents a 
detailed description of the practice, while using YouTube, the pioneer 
and exemplar of this phenomenon, as a case study to demonstrate the 
significance of Second Level Agreements.  The YouTube case reveals 
two conflicting movements:  the first is a movement toward 
standardization, and the second is a movement toward premium—as 
opposed to amateur—content partnerships.  Platforms’ operators and 
copyright holders have worked to maximize efficiency and lower 
transaction costs by using content identification and filtering 
technologies, as well as standardizing Second Level Agreements’ terms.  
While this should have allowed for more Second Level Agreements to 
emerge, another development has occurred concurrently to trigger a 
contradictory affect:  advertisers have found that original and derivative 
UGC is far less appropriate for commercials than premium content.11  
Consequently, platforms’ operators began to search for new revenue 
generators in the form of professionally produced content and the 
importance of UGC in the licensing priority has diminished. 12   
To conclude the doctrinal prong, this study maps out the sphere of 
the Second Level Agreements practice.  While video and audio sharing 
platforms have widely embraced Second Level Agreements, other UGC 
platforms, such as blogs, image-sharing, and fan fiction websites have 
not.  Several factors such as the ‘embed’ and ‘linking’ functions, 
technological difficulties of identification, and the non-concentrated 
nature of platforms operators and right holders are possible explanations 
for this disparity.13   
The Article also offers a normative assessment of the benefits and 
shortcomings of the Second Level Agreements practice.  Advantages 
like better information consumption, greater expression production, and 
broader infringement avoidance are juxtaposed against disadvantages 
such as the opacity surrounding the agreements, their non-inclusiveness 
and potential vulnerability, the lack of democratic ideals in this private 
self governance tool, the use of identification technologies that may lead 
to over-filtering, the advancement of a ‘clearance culture,’ and more.14   
The prescriptive discussion commences by pointing to the legal and 
practical implications of Second Level Agreements.  Legal defenses for 
 
 11. Brad Stone, Brooks Barnes, MGM to Post Full Films on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10mgm.html?_r=1.   
 12. Id.   
 13. See infra section V.C.   
 14. See infra section V.D.   
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users, such as implied license and estoppel, are discussed to demonstrate 
that Second Level Agreements bear legal significance for users 
irrespective of their absence from the contractual relationship.  Serving 
as an industry norm, Second Level Agreements have ample importance 
in the non-legal context as well.  Derivatively, a normative assessment is 
proposed, arguing that Second Level Agreements represent a desired 
development of copyright practice, and offering some improvements to 
augment the benefits of these pacts.  The Article then carefully looks at 
the future of Second Level Agreements while reviewing four potential 
catalysts—the shift towards premium content, the Viacom v. Google 
ruling,15 the move towards disintermediation, and the rise of non-
commercial licensing system.   
The remainder of this Article consists of seven parts.  Part II 
discusses the emergence of the Web 2.0 age, and offers a useful 
classification of UGC content.  Part III demonstrates the application of 
current copyright law to UGC platforms by reviewing theories of 
secondary liability and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
(“DMCA”) provisions.  Part IV considers the practice of tolerated use 
and its contribution to UGC platforms’ success and users’ ability to 
generate derivative content.  Second Level Agreements are described 
and studied thoroughly in Part V.  Part VI offers a normative 
contribution and careful prediction of the future of Second Level 
Agreements and copyright in the digital realm.  A conclusion follows in 
Part VII.   
II.  THE WEB 2.0 ERA AND THE INCEPTION OF UGC  
The advancements in the Internet’s capabilities are usually referred 
to as “Web 1.0,” “Web 2.0,” and “Web 3.0.”16  Under the Web 1.0 stage, 
the Web functioned as a read-only medium through numerous ‘static’ 
websites.  The following phase—Web 2.0—was defined as an “amalgam 
of ‘participatory Web’ applications,” which turned erstwhile passive end 
users into active producers by allowing them to generate and share 
content of all types.17  The decentralization of the Web became apparent 
through a move from publishing to participation, which empowered the 
 
 15. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).   
 16. Web 3.0 (or “Semantic Web”) is a future phrase, which is expected to be defined by the 
organization and classification of data collected from users’ online activities.  See Tanya M. Woods, 
Working Towards Spontaneous Copyright Licensing: A Simple Solution for a Complex Problem, 11 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1141, 1160 (2009).   
 17. Eugene C. Kim, Note, YouTube: Testing the Safe Harbors of Digital Copyright Law, 17 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139 (2007).   
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Internet to operate as a platform rather than a mere data conduit.18  The 
Web 2.0 era has progressively shifted Internet business models into 
UGC.19  UGC is often defined as content uploaded and sometimes 
created by Internet users, rather than produced by the website itself.20  
Websites providing services like blogs, wikis, photo sharing, music 
sharing, and video sharing have become widespread.  Virtual worlds, fan 
fiction websites, and social networking sites (e.g., Myspace21 and 
Facebook22) have gained special popularity.23  Some UGC is also 
available on websites owned by traditional content companies, where 
people provide unprofessional news reports, photos, and videos with no 
compensation.24   
To comprehend the effect that UGC has had on the copyright 
world, one must first differentiate between divergent types of UGC.  The 
first kind is “Pure UGC,” which refers to original content created by 
users.  Many blogs, for example, consist of original content created by 
the bloggers posting it on their blog.  Another common example is 
original music posted by amateur artists on MySpace, YouTube, and 
other websites.  Because pure content is original, and uploading it 
neither infringes nor violates any copyright ban, copyright law intends to 
encourage the production of such UGC.   
The second type of UGC includes derivative content, which is 
created from adaptations of preexisting works.  This group incorporates 
UGC that adds or alters copyrighted works, but does not qualify as fair 
use.  “Fanvids”—user-made videos that edit together music and clips 
from television shows or movies—are a common example for such a 
use.25  Another illustration can be found in a video of a family event with 
 
 18. TERRY FLEW, NEW MEDIA 13 (2005).   
 19. UGC is called “user-created content” overseas.  See Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use 
& Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363 
(2009).   
 20. Hetcher, supra note 3, at 870.   
 21. MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com.   
 22. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com.   
 23. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 364.   
 24. E.g., CNN ireport, CNN, iReport.com.  UGC’s ability to displace traditional media has 
become known as “crowdsourcing”—“a method for using the public, typically via the Internet, to 
supply what employees and experts once did.” Sarah Kershaw, A Different Way to Pay for the News 
You Want, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/24/weekinreview/ 
24kershaw.html; Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006), 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html.   
 25. Casey Fiesler, Everything I need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How Existing Social 
Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 729, 733 (2008).   
6
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copyrighted music in the background.26  Unless the copyright owner 
granted permission, derivative UGC constitutes copyright infringement.   
The third category encompasses UGC, which employs preexisting 
works but does not amount to infringement under some limitation or 
exemption to the author’s exclusive right.  An example for such use can 
be found in the case of Corey Vidal.  Vidal, an online video amateur 
provider, posted on YouTube an Acapella tribute to film composer John 
Williams.27  The video displayed a four part harmony, in which the saga 
of the original Star Wars trilogy is recapped to a medley of Williams’ 
celebrated scores.  Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the fair 
use defense, the video was considered by many as a clear case of fair 
use.28  Thus, when YouTube took it down following a DMCA notice, 
wide criticism ensued until it was restored.29   
The fourth, and final, UGC classification consists of pure 
reproductions, such as time-shift recordings of popular TV shows, music 
sound recording and videos, etc.30  This kind of content is consensually 
regarded as copyright infringement.   
It is hard to determine the exact percentage of every UGC type 
because the percentage of infringing UGC currently uploaded to 
platforms is unknown and probably fluctuates from one site to another.  
A 2007 study found that less than six percent of all views on YouTube, 
the most popular UGC video site, were of copyrighted material.31  By 
 
 26. For example, video clip featuring a slideshow of a couple’s wedding day, in which Five 
for Fighting’s song—100 Years—used as a background:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
ctQtU9jUZQ4&feature=fvw (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).  See also JK Wedding Entrance Dance, 
supra note 2.   
 27. Star Wars (John Williams is the Man), YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lk5_OSsawz4.   
 28. E.g., Greg Sandoval, YouTube Users Caught in Warner Music Spat, CNET NEWS (Jan. 27, 
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10150588-93.html; Joe Windish, A Warner Music/Corey 
Vidal Take Down Tale, The Moderate Voice (Jan. 27, 2009), http://themoderatevoice.com/25981/a-
warner-musiccorey-vidal-take-down-tale/; Julian Sanchez, EFF Seeks Mashup Makers to Fight 
YouTube Filtering, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/02/eff-seeks-mashup-makers-to-fight-youtube-
filtering.ars.   
 29. On February 24, 2009, the original video returned after Vidal fought Warner’s claim, 
citing the video as being protected under fair use. Corey Vidal, COREY VIDAL, available at   
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corey_Vidal (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 30. For this reason, some commentators do not include the last type under the definition of 
UGC, because it resembles more of a peer-to-peer distribution than UGC.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 
6, at 1506.  For a different approach, see Kurt Hunt, Copyright and Youtube: Pirate’s Playground 
or Fair Use Forum?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 202 (2007), and Gervais, supra 
note 4, at 860.   
 31. Bri Holt, Heidi R. Lynn & Michael Sowers, Analysis of Copyrighted Videos on 
YouTube.com, VIDMETER.COM (2007), 
7
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examining a random sample of online videos, another study learned that 
twelve percent of the videos posted on YouTube constituted 
infringement of copyrighted works.32  Either way it is safe to state that 
while many original expressions are distributed using UGC platforms, a 
considerable amount of uploaded UGC infringes copyrights.  
To address this issue and to demonstrate the liability claims that 
lurk for UGC platforms and users, the next section reviews the 
application of copyright law to UGC.  The sketched legal frame 
underscores the riddle—how a vast amount of infringing UGC can 
reside on UGC platforms without being removed, and how UGC 
platforms continue to prosper without powerful copyright owners rising 
up against them in the same way they fought erstwhile facilitators of 
online infringement.   
III.  APPLYING COPYRIGHT LAW TO USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
Some forms of UGC constitute clear copyright infringement.  Yet, 
locating end-users who infringe copyrighted works can be both difficult 
and expensive.33  Thus, copyright owners have attempted to accumulate 
their legal claims by bringing suits for secondary liability against 
operators of platforms that facilitate copyright violations.34  In the 
copyright context, therefore, the issues brought up by the rise of UGC 
platforms relate mainly to secondary liability.  The following review 
delineates the secondary liability regime and its applicability in the case 
of UGC platforms.   
A. Secondary Liability 
For decades copyright litigation centered on direct infringement, as 
well as on theories of indirect copyright infringement, although the 
Copyright Act does not expressly provide for secondary liability.35  The 
 
http://uploadi.www.ris.org/editor/1176893367vidmeter_copyright_report.pdf.http://www.vidmeter.c
om/i/vcopyrightidmeter__report.pdf.  However, the methodology of this study was criticized 
because it considers UGC as not copyrighted unless a DMCA take-down notice was issued.  See 
Sawyer, supra note 19, at 364.   
 32. YouTube Statistics, DIGITAL ETHNOGRAPHY (2008), available at 
http://ksudigg.wetpaint.com/page/YouTube+Statistics (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 33. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites and the DMCA: A 
Safe-Harbor from Copyright Liability or the Perfect Storm?, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 8 
(2007).   
 34. Id.   
 35. Greg Jansen, Whose Burden is it Anyway? Addressing the Needs of Content Owners in 
DMCA Safe Harbors, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 153, 157 (2010).   
8
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latter arose from judicial interpretation of the Copyright Act, and came 
to include contributory infringement and vicarious infringement.36  
Contributory infringement requires a defendant to have knowledge of 
the infringing material and to have induced, caused, or materially 
contributed to the infringing conduct.37  Courts find vicarious liability 
when the defendant had the right and ability to control the direct 
infringer and received a financial benefit from the direct infringement.38  
With the rise of products and services that enabled users to infringe on 
copyright more easily, copyright owners attempted to prevent 
infringement at the offering of the products and services facilitating such 
infringement.  The most prominent example is the legal battle over the 
VCR in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.39   
Contributory liability may be especially relevant to UGC platforms, 
which risk potential liability based on the theory of being facilitators of 
direct infringements.40  Indeed, most UGC platforms are not used only 
for infringing purposes, thus according to the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Sony, secondary liability should not arise.41  Still, UGC platforms host 
a great amount of user-uploaded materials that often directly infringe a 
copyright.  Some argue that notifications sent by copyright owners to 
UGC websites, alleging copyright infringement, could establish 
“knowledge” on the part of the platform’s owner, thereby subjecting it to 
potential contributory liability.42  Moreover, the Sony Court held that in 
an ongoing relationship, the alleged secondary infringer is in a position 
to control the use of the copyrighted works by the primary infringer.43  
Because most UGC platforms require users to create an account to 
upload materials, it can be argued that they maintain ongoing 
relationships with their users, which may expose them to secondary 
liability as well.  UGC platforms may also be found vicariously liable if 
they receive a direct financial benefit for infringing activities, such as 
advertisement revenue.   
 
 36. Lisa Veasman, ‘Piggy Backing’ on the Web 2.0 Internet: Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 
Mashups, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 319 (2008).   
 37. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971).   
 38. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (citing 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)).   
 39. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).   
 40. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 33, at 17.   
 41. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42.   
 42. Id.   
 43. Id. at 437.   
9
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B. The DMCA Safe Harbors and the Liability of OSPs 
The DMCA established safe harbors to protect online service 
providers (OSPs) from monetary liability for material that is transmitted 
over networks,44 cached on a server,45 residing on systems or networks at 
the direction of users,46 or linking users to an online location containing 
infringing material or infringing activity, by deploying information 
location tools.47  To qualify for the safe harbor protection, an OSP must 
fall under one of the aforementioned categories, and demonstrate the 
adoption and implementation of certain policies.  First, an OSP is 
obligated to adopt and reasonably implement a stated policy “for the 
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat 
infringers.”48  Second, an OSP must also not interfere with “standard 
technical measures” employed by copyright owners to identify 
infringing content.49  Additional criteria for qualifying for the DMCA’s 
safe harbor status are set forth in sections 512(c)(1) and 512(i), as each 
safe harbor has separate statutory requirements limiting its applicability.   
Of the four DMCA safe harbors, section 512(c), which safeguards 
OSPs who have infringing content “Residing on Systems or Networks at 
Discretion of Users,” is at the center of attention in the UGC context.  
Many UGC websites such as YouTube, Myspace, Dailymotion,50 
Facebook, Flickr,51 and Vimeo52 qualify under section 512(c) to be 
considered hosts of such content.  Still, these platforms would have to 
comply with the additional requisites in the section to enjoy the safe 
harbor status, which then places the burden of identifying infringing 
works squarely on copyright owners.53  First, they are required to have 
no actual or constructive knowledge that infringing content is on their 
system.54  If an OSP becomes aware of any infringing activity, it must 
 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).   
 45. Id. § 512(b).   
 46. Id. § 512(c).   
 47. Id. § 512(d).   
 48. Id. § 512(i)(2)(A).   
 49. Id. § 512(i)(1)(B), § 512(i)(2).   
 50. DAILY MOTION, http://www.dailymotion.com/us.   
 51. FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com.   
 52. VIMEO, http://vimeo.com.   
 53. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The DMCA 
notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the 
potentially infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners 
of the copyright.”).   
 54. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2000).   
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/3
8- LEVARETZ MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:30 AM 
2012] SECOND LEVEL AGREEMENTS 147 
immediately remove or disable access to the material.55  Moreover, an 
OSP cannot gain a direct financial benefit from any infringing activity.56  
A designated agent, whose contact information ought to be registered 
with the United Stated Copyright Office and accessible to the public, 
must be available to “receive notifications of claimed infringement.”57  
Upon encountering an allegedly infringing use, the copyright owner 
would locate the platform’s designated agent and send her a “written 
communication.”58  When an OSP receives such notification, it is 
required to follow the procedure set forth in section 512(c)(3)—to 
“respond expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that 
is claimed to be infringing.”59  Failure to comply would cause the OSP 
to lose its safe harbor status, and enable the copyright owner to request a 
subpoena to identify the alleged infringer.60   
Two of the most recent cases to discuss the safe harbors provided 
by section 512(c) involved a video-upload site—Veoh, which was 
claimed to be contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright 
infringement in videos uploaded to its servers.61  In IO Group. Inc. v. 
Veoh Networks. Inc., the Court held that when a video-sharing website 
could not locate infringing materials using simple text searches, the 
platform does not have a practical ability to control the infringing 
activity as content could be mislabeled.62  Moreover, the decision 
indicates that any actual or apparent knowledge of infringement may be 
mitigated if the platform expeditiously removes or disables access to 
infringing material.63  Under the court’s interpretation, an OSP may 
utilize an automated process to facilitate a third party’s request to upload 
content without losing safe-harbor protections.64   
Another case against Veoh was decided in September 2009.  In 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., Judge Matz of the 
Central District of California issued a summary judgment in favor of 
Veoh, holding that it had made reasonable efforts to follow section 
 
 55. Id.   
 56. Id. §512(c).   
 57. Id. §512(c)(2).  Contact information includes the agent’s name, address, phone number, e-
mail address, and any other information that the Register of Copyright deems appropriate.   
 58. Id. § 512(c)(3).   
 59. Id. § 512(c)(3).   
 60. Id. § 512(h).   
 61. IO Grp. Inc. v. Veoh Networks. Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2008); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2009).   
 62. See IO Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.   
 63. Id. at 1149.   
 64. Id. at 1147-48.   
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512(c) of the DMCA.65  The court rejected UMG’s arguments as to the 
implied knowledge of infringement imputed to Veoh, and found that 
Veoh lacked the right and ability to control infringements despite its 
technological control over the site.66  Specifically, the court noted that 
Veoh properly complied with the notice-and-takedown procedure 
expeditiously,67 and even implemented standard content filtering 
software, something it was not specifically required to do by law.68 
An appeal filed by UMG was recently rejected by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.69  The court stated that copyright holders 
are better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than service 
providers like Veoh,70 and that § 512(m) of the DMCA did not impose 
investigative obligations on service providers.71  Furthermore, a service 
provider will be deprived of its safe harbor immunity only if it has 
specific knowledge of infringing content on its site and fails to take 
down that content.72  General knowledge that some infringing content 
has been posted is insufficient for that matter.73  Notably, the court held 
that right holders can only rely upon a valid DMCA takedown 
notification to show specific knowledge of infringing material.74   
Another recent decision to analyze UGC platforms’ status under the 
DMCA is Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.75  The $1 billion 
lawsuit, which was filed by Viacom in March 2007, accused YouTube 
of widespread and willful infringement of Viacom’s movies, TV shows, 
and other content, after YouTube knowingly allowed clips from 
Viacom-owned programs to run, although they were illegally posted.76  
YouTube maintained that while it was aware of copyrighted content 
being uploaded to YouTube, as long as it proactively acted to remove 
the infringing materials on their own or following the receipt of a 
DMCA takedown notice from Viacom, YouTube has complied with the 
 
 65. See UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.   
 66. Id. at 1112.   
 67. Id.   
 68. Id.   
 69. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 70. Id. at 1010. 
 71. Id. at 1015.  
 72. Id. at 1010. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 1010-12.  
 75. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 76. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and 
Demand for Jury Trial, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-02103, 2008 WL 2062868 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008).   
12
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DMCA requirements, and thus was shielded under a safe harbor status.77  
U.S. District Court Judge Louis Stanton sided with YouTube, delivering 
a summary judgment that essentially endorses current practices.  The 
court held that while YouTube certainly knew copyrighted content had 
been posted on its site, general awareness of infringement was not 
tantamount to “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of 
individual items.”78  The court went on to say that because YouTube 
promptly removed the copyrighted materials upon receiving a notice 
from Viacom, YouTube was protected from liability under the DMCA.79  
Calling the decision “fundamentally flawed,” Viacom appealed the 
decision recently, so the last word is yet to be told. 80   
Given that UGC involves many cases of copyright infringement, 
one would have expected copyright owners to rise up against UGC 
platforms in the same way they opposed previous facilitators of online 
infringing activity.  Nonetheless, the Web 2.0 era was not accompanied 
by a tidal wave of major lawsuits.  While several lawsuits have been 
brought against UGC platforms, it appears that the previous resort to 
litigation was somewhat enfeebled by the materialization of UGC 
platforms, which instead stimulated two developments of copyright 
practice—tolerated use and Second Level Agreements.   
IV.  TOLERATED USE 
The prior discussion highlighted UGC dual complexion.  On the 
one hand, UGC platforms follow the constitutional ambition to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts”81 by enabling free speech and 
spurring expression.  On the other hand, UGC raises many copyright 
issues, such as originality, ownership, secondary liability, copyright 
infringements, fair use, and over-filtering of desired expression.  Within 
this duality, UGC platforms keep operating successfully all over the 
Internet.  This prosperity is not self-explanatory if one is mindful of the 
extensive infringement that constantly takes place on these platforms.82  
 
 77. Defendants’ Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Viacom 
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No 1:07-cv-02103, 2008 WL 2260018 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008).   
 78. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d. at 519.   
 79. Id. at 528.   
 80. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 2010 WL 
5066007 (Dec. 3, 2010) (No. 10-3270).   
 81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (defining legislative branch’s role regarding copyright and 
patent).   
 82. Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated Content, 13 NO. 1 J. 
INTERNET L. 1, 8 (2009).   
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A possible explanation that was offered by legal scholarship is ‘tolerated 
use’—“infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright 
owner may be aware, yet does nothing about.”83  This informal practice 
may be grounded in a copyright owner’s laziness, expansive 
enforcement costs, a desire to create goodwill, or a strategic decision to 
enjoy the benefit of the unauthorized use.84    
Tolerated use is notably present in daily UGC practice.85  Even 
though many users freely use the copyrighted works of others without 
prior permission and beyond the conventional understandings of fair use, 
sometimes copyright holders do not seem to be particularly concerned 
with such uses, and sometimes even express their informal approval.86  
Fan fiction websites, where users make derivative works of popular 
copyrighted works and share them online, are a good example of 
tolerated use.  To demonstrate, look at the “Leaky Cauldron,” an all-
purpose site for the Harry Potter enthusiasts.87  The site hosts, among 
other offerings, a comprehensive Potter news archive, images, videos, 
fan art galleries, downloadable widgets, a chat room, discussion forum, 
and various essay projects.  As Professor Tim Wu puts it, the “Leaky 
Cauldron” represents “an orgy of copyright infringement.”88  
Surprisingly however, not only has the fan fiction site fully operated for 
several years now, but J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry Potter 
books, has publicly referred to it as “my favorite fan site” and “a 
wonderfully well-designed mine of accurate information on all things 
Harry Potter” that “attracts a lot of knowledgeable and entertaining 
debate.”89   
Tolerated use is also evident in popular user-created, pseudo-movie 
trailers,90 such as “The Evil Pinocchio,” a short trailer recasting 
 
 83. Wu, Tolerated Use, supra note 5.   
 84. Id. at 619.   
 85. Steven Hetcher briefly argues that so-called “cut-and-paste” creative works, as long as 
non-commercial, are to be tolerated by the entertainment industry.  Steven Hetcher, User-Generated 
Content and the Future of Copyright: Part two—Agreements Between Users and Mega-Sites, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 829, 841 (2008).   
 86. Lee, supra note 6, at 1461.   
 87. THE LEAKY CALDRON, http://www.the-leaky-cauldron.org.   
 88. Tim Wu, Tolerated Use: The Copyright Problem, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2007), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2175730/entry/2175731/.   
 89. A Brief (Believe It Or Not) History of The Leaky Cauldron, THE LEAKY CALDRON, 
http://www.the-leaky-cauldron.org/info/siteinfo (last visited Nov. 18 2011).  Moreover, even though 
fan fiction has existed on the Internet for years, no copyright holder has ever challenged it to a 
judgment in court.  See Lee, supra note 6, at 1515.   
 90. Lee, supra note 6, at 1515.   
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/3
8- LEVARETZ MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:30 AM 
2012] SECOND LEVEL AGREEMENTS 151 
Pinocchio into an evil creature that wishes to destroy the world.91  
Photos and videos documenting trips to Disneyland or Universal 
Orlando Resort provide an additional example of tolerated use, as many 
of them constitute copyright infringement.  Nonetheless, Disney and 
Universal have neither a stated policy against nor a formal approval for 
such uploads, so many vacation photos and videos can be found online.92   
By its nature, tolerated use is vulnerable as it may instantly turn 
into a licensing relationship or liability battle.  Because the user has no 
costs to bear under this practice, she has no incentive to turn this status-
quo into one of the other legal relationship forms.  Hence, it is 
predominantly the copyright owner who determines the duration of the 
use, and a possible move into either licensing or liability courses.   
While tolerated use is clearly present in copyright practice, it is not 
sufficient to explain the current state of UGC.  Many copyright holders 
do not tolerate infringing usage, and exercise their right to ask for its 
removal pursuant to the DMCA.93  Although users can send a counter 
notification under the DMCA if they believe that the material has been 
wrongly removed,94 many of them are either not aware of this right95 or 
are not willing to take the risk of litigating a copyright lawsuit with an 
anticipated expenditure of $400,000 in litigation costs.96  This intensifies 
the enigma—even though counter notifications are not very common, 
and tolerated use is not ubiquitous, UGC platforms are thriving 
notwithstanding the vast amount of infringing content they host.  A 
suggested key to this puzzle is the practice of Second Level Agreements.   
 
 91. The Evil Pinocchio Trailer, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZBjtYkl0vE 
(May 24, 2006).   
 92. Jason Cochran, Legal limbo: Disney could go after you for posting vacation videos online, 
WALLET POP (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.walletpop.com/blog/2010/01/19/legal-limbo-disney-
could-go-after-you-for-posting-vacation-vide/5 (“It’s tough to get an exact number of vacation 
videos already online, but YouTube a search for ‘Disney World vacation’ pulls about 67,500 hits, 
while individual attractions got smaller numbers: It’s a Small World claims 4,230 and Splash 
Mountain offers 2,160.”).   
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).   
 94. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).   
 95. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006) (showing that minimal evidence of counternotices and 
putback has been found).   
 96. According to Intellectual Property Law Institute, a survey of the average costs of 
copyright litigation is $400,000.  See MICHAEL L. LOVITZ, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: 
LITIGATING TRADEMARK, DOMAIN NAME & UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES, STRATEGIES FOR 
FUNDING IP LITIGATION: INSURANCE AND OTHER AVENUES 1 (2006).   
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V.  SECOND LEVEL AGREEMENTS 
A. Definition and Background  
A Second Level Agreement can be defined as a preemptive license 
obtained by UGC platforms owners in order to ratify the mass usage of 
copyrighted content by their users.  A copyright owner authorizes the 
use of specified works by the platform’s users in return for royalties, 
company stakes, or ad revenue share.  While a First Level Agreement 
involves the copyright owner on the one hand and the user on the other, 
Second Level Agreements are negotiated and executed by copyright 
owners and platform operators.  In other words, Second Level 
Agreements authorize unidentified uses of copyrighted content by users 
in UGC platforms.   
The practice of Second Level Agreements has developed within the 
relatively short time of its existence.  The first agreements were 
negotiated individually and represented a specific solution for UGC 
copyright infringements.  Any information as to the financial 
arrangements, the agreed enforcement course, and the place of UGC in 
these pacts, could be obtained solely from the few press releases and the 
media.  As time went by, the agreements became more standardized, and 
were usually based on identification technologies that platforms began to 
employ.97  Thanks to such technologies, copyright owners can now 
identify their works and choose to block, track, or monetize them.98  
When a copyright holder takes the blocking path, the alleged infringing 
content will be immediately removed.  Under a monetization policy, the 
unauthorized use will remain available on the website, and ads will 
appear in conjunction with the content.  The tracking option acts as an 
intervening or ancillary phase, which enables the owner of the copyright 
to follow statistics about her work before deciding on or along with 
blocking or monetizing.   
Second Level Agreements represent a new phenomenon in 
copyright practice.  Throughout the history of copyright, a provider of 
copyrighted content—as opposed to a passive consumer—has always 
operated under some agreement to which she was a party.  At first, the 
author who offered the work negotiated the terms of the granted license 
with the user.  Later, intermediaries emerged, acting as providers of 
 
 97. YouTube was the first to offer this multi-choice regime, but many UGC platforms have 
followed suit.  See Block, Monetize, or Track Viewing Metrics—It’s Automated, and It’s Free, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 98. Id.   
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content themselves, and accordingly enjoyed the privity of contract with 
both the end user and copyright owner.99  Because the role of 
intermediaries is based on economies of scale, they could not have 
effectively interceded when the user is itself a provider of content, and 
especially when derivative use is involved.  In such case, the user’s 
employment of a copyrighted work usually requires a deviation from 
standard licensing terms.  Without a valid defense, such as fair use, the 
user-provider must have individually negotiated the terms of her license 
with the copyright owner to lawfully use the copyrighted work.  Because 
individual negotiations between users-providers and copyright holders 
entail high transaction costs and often involve unequal bargaining 
power, they cannot be expected to enable mass creation of content by 
users.   
Nevertheless, the Web 2.0 era and the dawn of UGC have enabled, 
for the first time, a group of creative users to enjoy and potentially 
utilize economies of scale.  UGC platforms allow creative users to 
become providers of content, which is distributed for free and in great 
numbers through the platforms’ facilities.  In this sense, UGC represents 
not only a potential for mass copyright infringement but also a prospect 
of mass creation.  While mass infringement has led to the development 
of secondary liability in copyright law, no equivalent legal doctrine was 
introduced to capture the promise of mass creation—that is, not until 
recently.  Recently, amid concerns about the effect of secondary liability 
on the operation of platforms, and a desire to unlock the vast marketing 
potential on the rights holders’ end, Second Level Agreements were 
born.  By de-facto allowing mass production by users, Second Level 
Agreements act as the missing facilitator of lawful mass creation.   
The first to employ Second Level Agreements as a business model 
was YouTube, which has entered several contracts in the United States 
and worldwide for authorizing the use of copyrighted works by its 
users.100  While YouTube is the undeniable pioneer of the Second Level 
 
 99. Wu named it a “gatekeeping regime.” Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
679, 711 (2003) (“The gatekeepers were book publishers at first; later gatekeepers included record 
manufacturers, film studios, and others who produced works on a mass scale.  Their role resembled 
that of doctors with respect to prescription drugs—they prevented evasion of the law by blocking 
the opportunity to buy an infringing product in the first place.”).   
 100. For a list of YouTube’s U.S. deals, see infra notes 119, 129 and accompanying text.  
YouTube has also reached licensing agreements with copyright owners all over the world, e.g., the 
Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers (JASRAC), see Tomohisa Takei, 
JASRAC-protected Songs Becomes Available on YouTube, TECH-ON (Oct. 24, 2008), 
http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/english/NEWS_EN/20081024/160039/; SBS Broadcasting Group (SBS 
Netherlands), see Editors’ Comment, Content Deals with SBS and UMG Widens Reach YouTube, 
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Agreements practice, other UGC platforms signed similar licensing 
deals.  Yahoo! entered a Second Level Agreement with Sony BMG in 
2007.101  The Social networking site, MySpace, stroke a comparable deal 
with Sony BMG in 2007,102 and with Viacom-owned MTV Networks in 
2008.103  Another social networking site, imeem, which was shut down 
after MySpace acquired it in December 2009,104 entered content deals 
with Warner Music Group,105 Sony BMG,106 EMI,107 and Universal 
Music Group.108  Dailymotion, a video sharing service website based in 
France, has also entered a series of revenue-sharing partnerships with 
French and international content owners.  Among its content partners are 
the SPPF (Société Civile des Producteurs de Phonogrammes en 
France),109 Warner Music,110 EMI,111 and Universal Music Group.112  In 
 
SEARCHCOWBOYS.COM (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.searchcowboys.com/socialmedia/1050; 
Britain Channel 4, see Mark Sweney, YouTube Signs Landmark Deal to Screen Channel 4 Shows, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct.15, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/oct/15/youtube-channel-4-
google-deal; Irish Music Rights Organisation (Imro) and the Mechanical Copyright Protection 
Society Ireland (MCPSI), see Mark Tighe, Musicians to Get a Cut from YouTube, TIMES ONLINE 
(Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article7078948.ece; and the 
French broadcaster Lagardère Active, see Ruth Bender, YouTube Signs Online Video Agreement, 
SMART MONEY (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.smartmoney.com/news/on/?story=ON-20100412-
000264.   
 101. Barry Levine, Yahoo and Sony BMG Team on User-Generated Content, NEWS FACTOR 
(Nov. 22, 2007), http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=12300BAYD9TL.   
 102. Yinka Adegoke, MySpace in Ad-supported Music Deal with Sony BMG, REUTERS UK 
(Oct. 16, 2007), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKWNAS648120071016.   
 103. Steve O’Hear, MTV and MySpace Partner to Monetize Pirated Content, ZD NET (Nov. 3, 
2008), http://blogs.zdnet.com/social/?p=602&tag=col1;post-602#more-602.   
 104. See imeem, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imeem.   
 105. Warner Music drops Imeem suit, forms partnership, REUTERS (July 12, 2007), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1226729920070712.   
 106. Press Release, Sony Music, Imeem Announces Content Agreement with Sony BMg 
Music Entertainment (Sept. 28, 2007), http://press.sonymusic.com/2007/09/28/imeem-announces-
content-agreement-with-sony-bmg-music-entertainment/(http://www.sonymusic.com/posts/50-
imeem-announces-content-agreement-with-sony-bmg-music-entertainment).   
 107. Erick Schonfeld, Imeem Adds EMI to Its Stable, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 27, 2007), 
http://techcrunch.com/2007/10/29/imeem-adds-emi-to-its-stable/. 
 108. Press Release, SMP, imeem Strikes Deal with Universal Music Group (Dec. 10, 2007), 
http://www.socialmediaportal.com/PressReleases/2007/12/imeem-Strikes-Deal-withUNIVERSAL-
MUSIC-GROUP.aspx.   
 109. A one-year “experimental agreement,” signed in December 2006, where the SPPF acts 
directly with Dailymotion on behalf of all its users.  See Jondet Nicolas, The Silver Lining in 
Dailymotion’s Copyright Cloud, JURISCOM.NET (Apr. 19, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134807.   
 110. Press Release, Warner News, Warner Music Group and Dailymotion Announce Video 
Content Partnership (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.wmg.com/newsdetails/id/8a0af8122718229f01272fda125d0f97.   
 111. EMI Music and Dailymotion Announce a Global Music Video Partnership, DAILYMOTION 
BLOG (Feb. 11, 2010), 
18
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October 2007, Dailymotion signed additional revenue-sharing deals with 
Turner Broadcasting Europe (a subsidiary of Time Warner) and USPA 
(L’Union Syndicale de la Production Audiovisuelle), which represents 
producers of television shows.113    
B. YouTube’s Content Partnerships as a Case Study 
YouTube was initiated in February 2005, when three ex-PayPal 
employees were looking for a way to easily share videos from a dinner 
party with a small circle of friends.114  “When we registered the 
YouTube domain on February 14, 2005, we set out to create a place 
where anyone with a video camera and an Internet connection could 
share a story with the world,” Chad Hurley, YouTube’s co-founder and 
current CEO, wrote on the company’s blog a few months ago.115  
YouTube grew at an astounding rate as users kept uploading personal 
videos to share with friends.  In November 2006, within a year of its 
launch, YouTube was purchased by Google Inc. for $1.65 billion in 
stock.116  Today, YouTube is the world’s largest repository for video 
clips on the Internet, with over 48 hours of video uploaded to YouTube 
every 60 seconds117 and hundreds of millions of videos watched every 
day.118 YouTube’s popularity in its first years was mainly due to the 
copyrighted material users uploaded to the site.  Because the site’s 
acquisition by Google provided copyright holders a deep pocket to 
target, some of them, led by Viacom, which sued the site for more than 
$1 billion, started suing YouTube for copyright infringement.119  
Attempting to avoid lawsuits and to make YouTube a better source for 
 
http://blog.dailymotion.com/index.php/page/2/http://blog.dailymotion.com/en/index.php/2010/02/11
/emi-music-and-dailymotion-announce-a-global-music-video-partnership/.   
 112. Jondet, supra note 110.   
 113. Id.   
 114. Ernie Smith, 20 Highlights From YouTube’s First Five Years, AOL NEWS (Feb. 17, 
2010), http://www.aolnews.com/tech/article/20-highlights-from-youtubes-first-five-years/19362101. 
 115. Chad Hurley, YouTube & the Online Video Revolution, BROADCASTING OURSELVES ;) 
THE OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG (Feb. 14, 2010), http://youtube-
global.blogspot.com/2010/02/youtube-online-video-revolution.html.   
 116. Paul R. La Monica, Google to buy YouTube for $1.65 Billion, CNN MONEY (Oct. 9, 2006, 
5:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/googleyoutube_deal/index.htm?cnn=yes.   
 117. Thanks, YouTube community, for two BIG gifts on our sixth birthday!, BROADCASTING 
OURSELVES ;) THE OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG (May. 25, 2011), http://youtube-
global.blogspot.com/2011/05/thanks-youtube-community-for-two-big.html.   
 118. Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011).   
 119. Don Reisinger, In just five years, YouTube became the go-to video site, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 
15, 2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/02/youtube-fifth-birthday.html.   
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profit, Google has entered into content partnerships with various music 
and entertainment companies.   
The first Second Level Agreement took place in 2006, when 
YouTube announced a video distribution and revenue partnership with 
Warner Music Group.120  According to YouTube’s press release, under 
the “first-of-its-kind arrangement, YouTube users will be able to 
incorporate music from WMG’s recorded music catalog into the videos 
they create and upload onto YouTube.”121  Less than a month later, 
YouTube formed similar arrangements with Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment,122 Vivendi’s Universal Music Group,123 and CBS 
Corporation.124  After signing another agreement with EMI on May 
2007, YouTube succeeded in licensing content from all four major 
music conglomerates in the United States.125  Additional pacts were 
made with the NBA,126 Chelsea Football Club,127 Sony Pictures, 
Lionstage, Starz,128 and more.129   
The first set of Second Level Agreements involved months of 
negotiations, and focused by and large on user uploaded content 
(original materials, derivative works and reproductions).  The press 
release following the first YouTube-Warner pact emphasized the role of 
users and their benefits under the new arrangement.  The same tendency 
was noticeable in the following agreement with Universal Music Group:   
 
 120. Press Release, supra note 7.   
 121. Id.   
 122. Press Release, YouTube, Sony BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License 
Agreement with YouTube (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/sony-bmg-
music-entertainment-signs-content-license-agreement-with-youtube-697542.htm). 
 123. Press Release, YouTube, Universal Music Group and YouTube Forge Strategic 
Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/universal-music-group-and-
youtube-forge-strategic-partnership-697518.htm).  
 124. CBS and YouTube Strike Strategic Content and Advertising Partnership, CBS 
CORPORATION (Oct. 6, 2006),  available at http://www.cbscorporation.com/news-
article.php?id=23http://www.thefutoncritic.com/news/2006/10/09/cbs-and-youtube-strike-strategic-
content-and-advertising-partnership-22498/20061009cbs01/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 125. Press Release, YouTube, EMI Music, Google and YouTube Strike Milestone Partnership 
(May 31, 2007), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/EMI-Music-Google-and-YouTube-
Strike-Milestone-Partnership-737984.htm.   
 126. Eric Bangeman, YouTube, NBA Sign Content Deal, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 27, 2007), 
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/02/8930.ars.   
 127. Rhys Blakely, Chelsea Signs YouTube Deal, TIMES ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2007), 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/media/ article1396564.ece.   
 128. Greg Sandoval, YouTube Signs Sony, Preps Site for Studio Content, CNET NEWS (Apr. 16, 
2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10221459-93.html.   
 129. Miguel Helft, Google Courts Small YouTube Deals, and Very Soon, a Larger One, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/02/technology/02google.html?_r=1.   
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In addition, under this agreement, UMG broadly embraces the power 
and creativity of user-generated content, allowing users to incorporate 
music from UMG’s recorded music catalog into the videos they create 
and upload onto YouTube.  UMG and its artists will be compensated 
not just for UMG produced videos but also for the unique, user created 
content that incorporates UMG music.130 
The licensing agreement with Sony BMG deviated slightly from the 
depicted course, and did not explicitly include UGC as part of the deal.  
Instead the parties agreed to “work together to develop new and exciting 
opportunities which allow users to include certain SONY BMG sound 
recordings in their own uploads, adding to the Internet’s most vibrant 
video entertainment destination.”131  Derivatively, it was also stated that 
Sony BMG will “work with YouTube to expeditiously remove certain 
copyrighted materials which are not available for exhibition on the 
site.”132   
The following partnership with EMI also underlined the use of 
copyrighted materials in UGC, tagging the pact as “a landmark 
agreement which will give YouTube users unprecedented access to 
authorized videos and recordings from EMI Music artists, including 
those featured in user generated content”.133  However, a new, more 
standardized method for Second Level Agreements emerged as the press 
release specifically referred to “YouTube’s industry-leading content 
management tools, which feature a content identification and reporting 
system that will help EMI track and monetize its content and 
compensate its artists.”134  Similar to the arrangement in the YouTube-
Sony partnership, and most likely pursuant to the new content 
identification technology, EMI would be able to “request the removal of 
EMI’s copyrighted content from YouTube.”135   
In 2007, YouTube also launched AudioSwap, a feature that allows 
users to easily replace audio in a clip with musical tracks from a library 
being built with help from artists with whom YouTube has content 
distribution deals.136  The most notable deal in this context was 
YouTube’s partnership with the sonic branding and music-licensing 
 
 130. Press Release, supra note 124 (emphasis added).   
 131. Press Release, supra note 123.   
 132. Id.   
 133. Press Release, supra note 126 (emphasis added).   
 134. Id.   
 135. Id.   
 136. YouTube AudioSwap, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/audioswap_main.  See Pete 
Cashmore, YouTube Launches AudioSwap—Keeping the RIAA Happy?, MASHABLE-THE SOCIAL 
MEDIA GUIDE (Feb. 23, 2007), http://mashable.com/2007/02/23/youtube-audioswap/.   
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agency Rumblefish.137  The AudioSwap option, however, is limited to 
adding the audio track as is to the video, with no option of editing the 
video (e.g., slowing the music at some points, cutting irrelevant 
segments, etc.).138  In this sense, the AudioSwap agreements heralded a 
drift towards standardizing Second Level Agreements.   
Another expression of the said standardization tendency is the 
development of content identification technology—usually referred to as 
“Content ID.”  While it appears that YouTube still negotiates 
individually with major content owners, the Content ID system makes 
the licensing process shorter, clearer, and more efficient.  To enjoy the 
system’s advantages, rights holders must deliver YouTube reference 
files (audio-only or video) of their content, metadata describing that 
content, and policies on what they want YouTube to do in case of a 
match.139  The system then compares videos uploaded to YouTube 
against those reference files, automatically identifies the copyrighted 
content, and applies the preferred policy:  monetizing through ad 
revenue share, track, or block.  The move into a standard process 
through YouTube’s Content ID has panned out to be a successful 
business model, with every major U.S. network broadcaster, movie 
studio, and record label using it.140  Over 1,000 content owners have 
uploaded to the system more than 1 million reference files (more than 
100,000 hours of material).141  The vast majority of copyright holders 
elect not to remove infringing content, but to monetize it by linking to 
official content or overlaying it with ads.142   
Common UGC, however, has turned out to be a poor source for 
advertisement revenue.  While people are prepared to view commercials 
and ads when watching professional content, they are for the most part 
 
 137. YouTube Taps Rumblefish for Music Catalog Access, RUMMBLEBLOG (Mar. 12, 2008), 
http://rumblefish.com/blog/2008/12/03/youtube-taps-rumblefish-for-music-catalog-
access/http://pressrelease.omani.ac/submit/youtube_taps_rumblefish_for_music_catalog_access.   
 138. See Music tracks in my video, YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (Apr. 18, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=13d5fbc81b1ec530&hl=en&search_im
pression_id=39ffb07e000b57f1%3A1283ae2f862&search_source=related_question (“Fair enough 
there is a feature called AudioSwap—which enables you to choose from a fair selection of music 
and overwrite your audio track with whatever track you pick from their AudioSwap library.  But 
how are you supposed to edit your video clips, especially where I want the clips to change in time to 
the music?”).   
 139. Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 140. Kyle Harrison, Over 1,000 content owners now using Content ID, YOUTUBE BIZ BLOG 
(Sept. 16, 2009), http://ytbizblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/over-1000-content-owners-now-using.html.   
 141. Id.   
 142. Liz Gannes, From Monitor to Monetize: The Evolution of YouTube Content ID, NEW TEE 
VEE (Sept. 28, 2009), http://newteevee.com/2009/09/28/from-monitor-to-monetize-the-evolution-
of-youtube-content-id/.   
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unwilling to do so when it comes to UGC.143  Furthermore, advertisers 
have found that user-created videos of pet pratfalls and oddball skits are 
largely incompatible with commercials for cars and other products.144  
With the costs of bandwidth and storage to stream more than 5 billion 
clips a month far exceeding YouTube’s revenue from advertising, 
YouTube has been striving to attract more professionally produced 
videos to lure higher-priced advertisements.145   
The imperative of making YouTube profitable brought about a shift 
from centering on authorized UGC to offering a vast library of 
professionally-produced videos.  YouTube entered deals to provide on-
demand premium short clips, e.g., the partnerships with BBC,146 
Channel 4,147 Disney,148 and Time Warner.149  YouTube has also signed 
pacts to broadcast full episodes of popular TV shows and even full 
length films,150 to stream live events (e.g., major sporting events,151 
 
 143. Yonatan Sela, Should a Video Website Include UGC?, TVINCI BLOG (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.tvinci.com/blog/?p=10.   
 144. Brad Stone, Brooks Barnes, MGM to Post Full Films on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10mgm.html?_r=1.   
 145. Brian Stelter & Miguel Helft, Deal Brings TV Shows and Movies to YouTube, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/business/media/17youtube.html [hereinafter 
Stelter & Helft].   
 146. Press Release, BBC, BBC and YouTube Partner to Bring Short-Form BBC Content to 
Online audiences (Mar. 2, 2007), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2007/03_march/02/you_tube.shtml).  
 147. See YouTube-Channel 4 Partnership, supra note 101.   
 148. Press Release, Disney, DISNEY/ABC Television Group and ESPN Reach Landmark 
Agreement (Mar. 30, 2009), 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2009/2009_0331_you_tube.html.   
 149. Time Warner Newsroom, Time Warner and YouTube Reach Agreement to Post Huge 
Array of Short-Form Clips From Movies, Television Shows and News Reports, TIME WARNER 




2009.php.   
 150. YouTube reached an agreement with HBO to stream full length episodes of HBO’s 
original series, “In Treatment” on HBO YouTube Channel.  See Press Release, YouTube, It’s Not 
TV; It’s HBO . . . On YouTube; HBO Launches Official YouTube Channel (Feb. 25, 2008), 
http://www.fiercewireless.com/press-releases/its-not-tv-its-hbo-youtube-hbo-launches-official-
youtube-channel.  YouTube also announced an agreement to show some full-length television 
shows and films from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios (MGM).  See Press Release, YouTube, MGM 
Partners with YouTube to Launch Several New Channels Featuring Fan-Favorite Clips, Full-Length 
Clips, Full-Length TV Shows and Films (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.pressreleasepoint.com/mgm-
partners-youtube-launch-several-new-channels-featuring-fanfavorite-clips-fulllength-tv-shows-and.   
 151.  In January 2009, YouTube announced its first worldwide sports deal to stream Indian 
Premier League (IPL) cricket matches live online.  The agreement enabled YouTube to have the 
rights to broadcast the cricket matches all over the world, not just in markets where the IPL has not 
sold TV rights.  See Mark Sweney, YouTube Confirms Worldwide Deal for Live Indian Premier 
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concerts,152 etc.), and to offer video rentals.153  All these agreements are 
not Second Level Agreements for they target the passive end-users 
rather than the users-providers addressed by Second Level Agreements.   
The YouTube case has demonstrated the progression of the Second 
Level Agreements practice through two, somewhat conflicting, market 
developments.  On the one hand, the gradual shift towards an efficient 
standard licensing process (enabled by identification and filtering 
technology and the AudioSwap library) has curtailed transaction costs 
and consequently encouraged the growth of the Second Level 
Agreements practice.  On the other hand, the inadequacy of UGC to 
provide an appropriate advertising medium has incentivized platforms to 
seek alternative revenue generators, thus moving down the place of 
UGC in the platform’s licensing priority.154   
While YouTube is a befitting representation of the depicted 
movements, one could also find them in other UGC platforms.  Social 
networking website, MySpace, has employed content identification 
technologies to enable copyright owners to monetize their content.155  At 
the same time, MySpace recognized that although UGC accounts for a 
majority of videos consumed in the United States, the bulk of revenues 
comes from premium content.  MySpace’s video vice president stated 
“we have seen big increases in premium intent viewing over UGC.  
 
League Cricket, GUARDIAN UK (Jan. 20, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jan/20/youtube-live-indian-premier-league.  The deal turned 
out to be a major success for YouTube as YouTube’s IPL Cricket has currently over 49.5 million 
views.  See Jason Kincaid, YouTube’s IPL Cricket Streams Near 50 Million Views, Blow Away 
Internal Expectations, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 23, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/23/youtubes-
ipl-cricket-streams-near-50-million-views-blow-away-internal-expectations/.   
 152. See Jarrett Martineau, YouTube to Stream Live Concert Event, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2008), 
http://www.nowpublic.com/tech-biz/youtube-stream-live-concert-event [YouTube Live Channel 
Account Closed]. 
 153. Rosemary Black, YouTube’s Video Rental Service Debuts Tomorrow with Five Indie 
Films, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2010/01/21/2010-01-
21_youtubes_video_rental_service_debuts_tomorrow.html.  See also YouTube Store, 
YOUTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/store (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 154. Some are expecting this tendency to increase in the future: “By 2011, ad-funded free to 
view TV shows will account for 10 times more consumption than paid.  By 2012, premium TV 
programming will have 10% more consumers than user-generated.” Matt O’Hern, User Generated 
Content is Dead, MARKETING SHIFT—ONLINE MARKETING BLOG (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://www.marketingshift.com/2008/12/user-generated-content-is-dead.cfm.   
 155. Jason Kincaid, MySpace, Auditude, and MTV Have just Figured out how to Monetize 
Online Video, TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/11/02/myspace-auditude-
and-mtv-have-just-figured-out-how-to-monetize-online-video/.   
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Premium content views probably close to doubled in the last year.”156  
The leading European UGC platform, Dailymotion, also went through 
the same process, as it employs identification technologies and has 
entered several content partnerships with copyright owners to broadcast 
various kinds of content to their users.157  Another example is the social 
networking site imeem, which announced in March 2007 a partnership 
with SNOCAP, a music technology company.  The parties agreed to 
launch a content identification registry system to enable artists to 
monetize their works when shared on imeem.158  From its early days, 
imeem permitted users to interact with each other by streaming, 
uploading, and sharing music and music videos.  However, in June 2009, 
imeem announced they were “simplifying” their website and deleting all 
user-generated photos and videos, because of costs and concerns over 
their return on investment.159  With virtually no return of imeem’s 
investment, as advertisers aren’t interested in seeing their content next to 
amateur videos, there wasn’t any reason left for hosting UGC.160   
C. The Sphere of Second Level Agreements 
Although Second Level Agreements have turned out to be a 
common practice within the operation of UGC platforms, a clear 
distinction must be made between different types of platforms.  While 
audio and video UGC are widely governed by Second Level 
Agreements, image-sharing, blogs, and fan fiction websites are not.  
Even though complaints about mass infringement on photo-sharing 
websites are widespread, there have been no reported content 
partnerships involving photo-sharing hosts.161  The same applies to 
 
 156. Erick Schonfeld, Visible Measures Now Tracking Videos at MySpace, TECH CRUNCH 
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/04/14/visible-measures-now-tracking-videos-at-
myspace/.   
 157. Jondet, supra note 110.   
 158. Press Release, supra note 109.   
 159. Frederic Lardinois, imeem Wants to Simplify Its Service - Deletes All User-Generated 
Photos and Videos, READ WRITE WEB (June 26, 2009), 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/imeem_wants_to_simplify_its_service_deletes_all_photos_
videos.php.   
 160. Id.   
 161. E.g., Mary Tafoya, Shame on Picasa, MARY TAFOYA BLOG (May 15, 2008), 
http://seriousbeader.blogspot.com/2008/05/shame-on-picasa.html (describing the case of a Picasa 
user who uploaded 53 public albums, all of which are full of scans of copyrighted books); Ian L. 
Sitren, Flickr Member Copyright Infringement (theft), SPORTS SHOOTER MEMBER MESSAGE BOARD 
(Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.sportsshooter.com/message_display.html?tid=27195 (complaining 
about a Flickr member who posted on his account 193 of Ian’s photos).   
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blogs, where copyright infringements occur all the time.162  Fan fiction 
websites, by their nature, invite extensive copyright infringements.163  
Still, no agreements have been reported between fan fiction platforms 
and copyright owners.164   
Not only have Second Level Agreements been employed 
exclusively by certain types of platforms, these agreements have also 
covered only certain types of content.  This is why copyright 
infringement in photographs is omnipresent on websites like YouTube 
and MySpace, regardless of their engagement in many content 
partnerships.165  Images are currently not included in any Second Level 
Agreement for several reasons.  First, it is possible that Second Level 
Agreements do not offer identification of images within a video because, 
while contemporary technologies can enable right owners to identify and 
locate images used on the Internet,166 images currently cannot be 
 
 162. In October 2006, Paparazzi photo agency, X17, sued celebrity gossip blogger Mario 
Lavandeira (aka Perez Hilton) for allegedly posting its photographic images without permission.  In 
January 2008, the parties reached a settlement and on April 21, 2008, the court dismissed the case 
without prejudice.  For a full description of the case, see X17 Inc. v. Lavandeira, CITIZEN MEDIA 
LAW PROJECT (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/x17-inc-v-
lavandeira#description (case discussed on the website is: X17 Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 
1102 (C.D. Cal., 2007)).   
 163. While many scholars advocate recognizing fan fiction as fair use, fan fiction is generally 
considered copyright infringement.  See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, 
and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 654 (1997) (calling to recognize certain types 
of fan fiction as fair use); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A 
Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597, 598-601 (2007); 
Rachel L. Stroude, Complimentary Creation: Protecting Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 14 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 191 (2010).   
 164. While some authors invite and encourage fan fiction (e.g., Star Trek creator Gene 
Roddenberry and Paramount Pictures, who publicly approved noncommercial Star Trek fan fiction), 
some authors (such as Anne Rice) have publicly asked fans to refrain from writing fan fiction.  See 
Lee, supra note 6, at 1532-33.   
 165. For example, Richter Scales, a San Francisco-based choral group made a video named 
“Here Comes another Bubble,” where the group mixed original imagery with photos found online, 
and set satirical lyrics about the Silicon Valley lifestyle to Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire.”  
The video quickly became a hit on YouTube, generating over one million views.  However, 
photographer Lane Hartwell, whose photograph appeared in the video, got the video removed from 
YouTube based on a claim of copyright infringement.  See Lewis Wallace, Why Lane Hartwell 
Popped the ‘Bubble’ Video, WIRED (Dec. 14, 2007), 
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/theweb/news/2007/12/photographers.  Following Hartwell’s 
complaint, the offending image was removed and the video is now back on YouTube.  See Here 
Comes Another Bubble v.1.1—The Richter Scales, YOUTUBE (Dec. 17, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6IQ_FOCE6I.   
 166. E.g., PICSCOUT—EVERY IMAGE GETS ITS CREDIT, http://www.picscout.com/ (PicScout is 
an information company that maintains a large index of fingerprinted and owner identified images, 
and enables its clients to protect and promote image usage across digital platforms and devices by 
using the company’s image recognition fingerprinting technology.).   
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detected under existing video identification technologies.  Second, 
supposedly following the lack of relevant identification technologies, a 
relatively small amount of infringement is being reported.  With rather 
few cases of detected copyright infringement in images, there is virtually 
no incentive for platforms to engage in Second Level Agreements with 
copyright holders.  In addition, when compared to music and motion 
pictures, images were never too expansive due to their limited 
popularity.  With the web offering a vast amount of free images, the 
average unit cost per image has decreased even more, making it a less 
desirable product for platforms’ users.167   
The absence of Second Level Agreements for image use has mainly 
two consequences.  First, Second Level Agreements have shifted the 
burden of paying for the identification technology and monitoring UGC 
from the copyright owner to the platform’s operator.  For example, 
music labels have employed identification technologies long before 
Second Level Agreements became a ubiquitous practice.  Between 2002-
04, Universal Music Group168 and EMI169 signed agreements with 
Audible Magic, a provider of content management and anti-piracy 
services, to provide audio fingerprinting services to identify copyrighted 
music on the Internet.  Notwithstanding these pacts, when the labels 
formed Second Level Agreements with platforms owners, the burden to 
initiate and maintain identification and filtering systems was imposed on 
the latter.  Because operators of photo-sharing platforms never entered 
any Second Level Agreement, no similar shift of burden occurred, thus 
right holders in images still bear the costs of tracking their content over 
the Web.  Second, image right holders often choose the course of either 
Creative Commons licensing170 or tolerated use.  Many of them post 
their photographs on photo-sharing platforms with full awareness of the 
likely possibility that others will use these photos.   
The centralization of the Second Level Agreements practice in 
video and audio content can be grounded in two additional explanations.  
 
 167. OECD, PARTICIPATIVE WEB AND USER CREATED CONTENT—WEB 2.0, WIKIS AND 
SOCIAL NETWORKING 61 (2007). 
 168. Press Releases, Audible, Magic Forms Agreement with Universal Music Group to 
Support its RepliCheck Anti-Piracy System (Aug. 12, 2003), 
http://www.audiblemagic.com/news/press-releases/pr-2003-08-12.asp.   
 169. Evan Hansen, EMI, Audible Magic ink anti-piracy deal, CNET (Apr. 21, 2001), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-963756.html.   
 170. For example, in March 2010, the estimated number of Creative Commons licensed images 
on Flickr was 135 million.  For detailed statistics, see Mike Linksvayer, Creative Commons licenses 
on Flickr: many more images, slightly more freedom, CREATIVE COMMONS NEWS (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/20870.   
27
Lev-Aretz: Second Level Agreements
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
8- LEVARETZ MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:30 AM 
164 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:137 
The first is the linking and embedding options, offered by many content 
websites, and the second is the nature of non-audio and video UGC 
platforms and copyright owners.  Linking and embedding are common 
in certain social networks sites (like Facebook), where the use of 
copyrighted materials is omnipresent.  Many bloggers also usually 
embed photos and videos to illustrate their posting.  The code that 
embeds an element is merely a text guiding the computer’s Internet 
browser to the location of the specified file.171  Recently the embedding 
function has been enhanced, as some major blogging platforms have 
come to facilitate the reproduction of content from other websites by 
offering a “reblog” feature.172  “Reblogging” is much the same as 
embedding; it enables the blogger to compose a new post housed on the 
blog suffixed with the headline, description, thumbnail, and link to the 
source material.173   
Major video streaming sites, including YouTube, allow most of 
their files to be embedded in other websites.174  Some photo-sharing 
websites also offer embedding features, although only the account 
holder, usually the person who uploaded the photographs, is authorized 
for such use.175  Twitter,176 a social networking and micro blogging 
 
 171. Jason J. Lunardi, Guerrilla Video: Potential Copyright Liability for Websites that Index 
Links to Unauthorized Streaming Content, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1077, 
1081 (2009).   
 172. TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/ (pioneered the reblog concept, enabling its users to 
repost content from another blog).  WordPress, the top host of blogs, added a “reblog” feature in 
June 2010.  We All Like to Reblog, WORDPRESS, http://en.blog.wordpress.com/2010/06/01/we-all-
like-to-reblog/.  The makers of Movable Type offer a reblog feature.  reBlog, MOVEABLE TYPE, 
http://plugins.movabletype.org/reblog/.  Google Blogger provides a BlogThis extension, which can 
be added to the browser’s toolbar, to create a mini-interface to Blogger, presented with a link to the 
web page the blogger is visiting.  What is BlogThis?!, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/support/blogger/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=41469. 
 173. Mark Milian, Reblog this at your own legal risk, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2010), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/06/reblog-copyright.html.   
 174. YouTube, however, also allows its users to disable the embedding feature on videos they 
post, at their discretion.  See Can I enable or disable the option to embed my videos?, GOOGLE, 
http:// www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=74648.  This is also true as 
to YouTube’s content partners.  EMI decided to block embedding functions on YouTube because 
the embedded videos could not be monetized.  See Liz Ohanesian, Why EMI’s YouTube Policy Is 
Short-Sighted, LA WEEKLY BLOGS (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://blogs.laweekly.com/westcoastsound/synthful/emi-youtube-ok-go/.   
 175. Flickr, for example, allows users to upload photos to their account and then embed them 
either as individual images or as a slideshow.  See Brian Herzog, Embedding Content in Websites, 
SWISS ARMY LIBRARIAN (June 17, 2008), 
http://www.swissarmylibrarian.net/2008/06/17/embedding-content-in-websites.   
 176. TWITTER, http://twitter.com.   
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platform, also put into practice a “retweet” (“RT”) feature, which allows 
its users to instantly repost messages with credit to the originator.177 
The legal status of linking, embedding, reblogging, and retweeting 
is unclear.  While uploading copyrighted content to a video hosting site 
by unauthorized users may strike one as an obvious copyright 
infringement, it does not seem as obvious if a site merely links to content 
that is already available on the Internet elsewhere.178  While the legality 
of embedding content exceeds the boundaries of this discussion, it is safe 
to argue that in cases of linking to infringing content without 
authorization, and absent a fair use defense, the secondary liability 
potential is fairly high.179  Yet, probably due to the practice of tolerated 
use as well as current Second Level Agreements covering some of the 
embedded content, embedded content is boundless over the Internet.  
With the ability to embed, which rarely encounters any demand of 
removal by the copyright owner, blog operators have little incentive to 
engage in Second Level Agreements.   
The practice of Second Level Agreements has also not extended to 
photo-sharing, blogs and fan fiction websites due to the non-
concentrated nature of the potential parties.  Photographers, fan fiction 
writers, and other authors, though they may be joined under some 
organization,180 often distribute their works as individuals or through 
small companies.  When a platform wishes to license the use made by its 
users, it is easier and cheaper to do so with one representative of several 
 
 177. What Is Retweet? (RT), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://help.twitter.com/forums/10711/entries/77606-what-is-retweet-rt.   
 178. Bloggers started debating the legality of embedding back in 2007.  The Blog Herald 
suggested that bloggers could be held liable for embedding and infringing video on their sites.  
Jonathan Bailey, Copyright Risks in Embedding YouTube Clips, THE BLOG HERALD (July 9, 2007), 
http://www.blogherald.com/2007/07/09/the-copyright-risk-of-embedding-youtube-clips/.  Fred von 
Lohmann argued that an embedded YouTube video is just a link so “there is no reason to be 
concerned about potential liability.”  Fred von Lohmann, YouTube Embedding and Copyright, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION DEEPLINKS BLOG (July 9, 2007), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/07/youtube-embedding-and-copyright.  Another post on Techdirt 
made a similar observation, stating that “[a]ll you’ve done is put a single line of HTML on your 
page.”  Mike Masnick, Is it Copyright Infringement to Embed an Infringing YouTube Video on Your 
Blog?, TECHDIRT (July 3, 2007), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070703/144358.shtml.  
Nonetheless, academic study of this issue is sparse, as only two law review articles discussing the 
question could be found: Seth A. Metsch, Embedded Media: Apps, Widgets, RSS and Embedded 
Content, 978 PLI/PAT 235 (2009), and Lunardi, supra note 172.  While Lunardi focuses on websites 
with embedded copyrighted video through in-line links, what he refers to as “indexing websites,” he 
does not analyze users embedded.  His review is helpful in the latter embedding context too.   
 179. See Metsch, supra note 179, at 245-47, and Lunardi, supra note 172, at 1116-25.   
 180. E.g., PPA—PROFESSIONAL PHOTOGRAPHERS OF AMERICA, http://www.ppa.com/; APA—
ADVERTISING PHOTOGRAPHERS OF AMERICA, http://www.apanational.com/; NATIONAL PRESS 
PHOTOGRAPHERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.nppa.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
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copyright owners, rather than to negotiate each license separately.  In 
this sense, the fact that many of the copyrights in music and motion 
pictures belong to a small number of companies enabled the practice of 
Second Level Agreements to flourish.  The same applies to the 
platforms; while it seems that blogs, fan-fiction, and photo-sharing 
websites adhere to a model of many small-scale websites,181 video and 
audio platforms operate within a much larger scale.182  The practical 
outcome of this observation is that video and audio platforms can offer 
exposure to a larger audience composed of both users-consumers and 
users-providers, which makes them more attractive partners for Second 
Level Agreements.   
In the following sections, I attempt to analyze the positive and 
negative aspects of the Second Level Agreements practice, offer some 
suggestions to ameliorate the practice to enhance certainty and 
transparency, and provide a prediction as to the agreements’ future.   
D. Second Level Agreements—Virtues and Vices 
Second Level Agreements are new creatures in copyright practice.  
They clearly indicate that cyberspace is moving toward a model of 
consensual self-governance against a backdrop of enforceable legal 
framework.  While these agreements represent many opportunities for 
copyright holders, users-consumers, and users-providers, they also 
involve some disadvantages that have to be considered.  It seems that in 
their never-ending relationship with technology, copyright owners have 
learned some lessons from the past, and rather than fighting the advent 
of UGC platforms as a distribution method, they have chosen to join 
forces with these platforms.  The Second Level Agreements practice 
evidences a preference of an agreement model over a culture of litigation 
and copyright infringements.   
Although Second Level Agreements cannot offer compensation 
similar to that provided by traditional distribution models, they benefit 
copyright owners in several ways.  First, copyright holders have a clear 
financial incentive to enter these agreements.  Even though the precise 
monetary terms of current Second Level Agreements are not disclosed, it 
was made public that copyright owners receive consideration in the form 
 
 181. Of course, there are big and popular websites such as Flickr and Picasa, and Google itself 
offers a Blogging platform.  Still, the popularity and success of these websites are far from 
YouTube or MySpace’s magnitude.   
 182. This can be explained by the relatively expensive cost of storing videos and audio, 
compared to texts (blogs and fan-fiction) and images (blogs, fan-fiction, and photo-sharing 
platforms).   
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of company stakes, ad revenue share, or royalties.183  Second, the 
practice of Second Level Agreements lowers monitoring costs for 
copyright owners with respect to content on UGC platforms, thereby 
enabling them to economize on enforcement costs (e.g., sending DMCA 
notices, litigation costs, etc.).184  Because near-perfect enforcement of 
the widespread copyright infringement over the Internet is virtually 
impossible, Second Level Agreements not only reduce enforcement 
costs, but also monetize uses that otherwise would not be generating 
revenues.185  The practice also lessens transaction costs, as copyright 
holders do not need to negotiate and execute individual licenses for a 
great number of users.  Third, on top of their role as content distributors, 
UGC platforms are an excellent promotion means.  Thanks to UGC 
platforms, copyright owners enjoy vast exposure and easy access to the 
copyrighted works of consumers and fans.  Studies show that currently 
content owners are badly deficient in media progression, and that UGC 
platforms provide an excellent way for them to distribute their content 
extensively to old and new viewers.186  Therefore, Second Level 
Agreements bestow upon copyright holders a form of “benefit basket”—
an opportunity to save previously spent costs, and to gain further 
compensation for uses of their works.   
Second Level Agreements are also advantageous to users.  From a 
user-consumer perspective, the total of available works to consume 
accelerated dramatically with the rise of UGC platforms.  Second Level 
Agreements boosted the said expansion, offering additional free content 
in better quality.  The variety of works has broadened too, as Second 
Level Agreements involve not only professionally produced content, but 
also amateur works and derivative adaptations.  Creative users enjoy the 
 
 183. For example, YouTube-WMG press release, states that: “YouTube and WMG will share 
revenue from advertising on both WMG music videos and user uploaded videos that incorporate 
audio and audiovisual works from WMG’s catalog.”  Supra note 7.   
 184. For example, NBC Universal used to employ a staff of three to police the copyright 
violations made possible by YouTube and to send over one thousand notice and takedown requests.  
See Branwen Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 
238-39 (2008).   
 185. Before Second Level Agreements were in play, many unauthorized uses were not even 
discovered by the copyright owner.  Even when a copyright owner found her work being used in a 
user-created work, she could either ask for the removal of the content through a notice and 
takedown procedure, or tolerate the use.  In neither of these choices could the copyright owner 
financially benefit from the use.   Second Level Agreements added another choice by allowing right 
holders to monetize such uses.   
 186. See Steve Ragan, YouTube Making Waves with Content Protection Offers, MONSTERS 
AND CRITICS (Feb. 26, 2007), 
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/tech/news/article_1269205.php/YouTube_making_waves_with
_content_protection_offers.   
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new practice as well because they may draw inspiration from a greater 
array of works, as more content is free and legally accessible.  Their 
opportunities for creation also grew considerably in view of the fact that 
users can now borrow protected elements of previously existing works, 
and employ them in new works without the burdensome obligation to 
negotiate a license or compensate the right holder.  Because many UGC 
platforms have to remove suspected infringing content pursuant to a 
DMCA notice, without Second Level Agreements, creative users had no 
creation alternatives and a great amount of speech would have been 
concealed.  Second Level Agreements made a long progress towards 
alleviating this problem, as much of the derivative UGC currently 
remains online.  Furthermore, Second Level Agreements have provided 
a unique opportunity for some creative users to disseminate their works 
on a larger scale, and even become professional providers of content.187   
Second Level Agreements, however, are not a panacea for all 
copyright dilemmas in the age of UGC.  They involve some difficulties 
that must be seriously considered.  First, Second Level Agreements have 
a significant effect on the legal state of users-providers, as they operate 
under a license to which they were not a party, and of whose terms they 
are not fully aware.  Although users may learn some details as to the 
terms of the agreements through the media, users cannot get full 
disclosure of what they are allowed to do pursuant to a Second Level 
Agreement.  Moreover, even though in practice UGC employing 
copyrighted content in accordance with an agreement will remain online, 
Second Level Agreements supposedly involve no legal consequences for 
users.  Users are legally bound only by the platform’s terms of service, 
which have not changed in accordance with the agreements.  For 
example, even YouTube, the most common signatory of Second Level 
Agreements, states in its terms of service:  “In connection with User 
Submissions, you further agree that you will not submit material that is 
copyrighted . . . unless you are the owner of such rights or have 
permission from their rightful owner to post the material and to grant 
YouTube all of the license rights granted herein.”188  Under these terms 
of service, Second Level Agreements purportedly have no legal 
 
 187. Cory Williams made his break in 2007 when he uploaded a music video parody, which 
has been viewed more than 15 million times.  With more than 80,000 subscribers to his videos, 
Williams earns $17,000 to $20,000 a month via YouTube.  See Brian Stelter, YouTube Videos Pull 
In Real Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/business/media/11youtube.html?_r=2 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011).   
 188. YouTube Terms of Service 6(D), YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2011).   
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influence over users, as the latter are still required not to submit 
copyrighted materials, regardless of the fact that such content may be 
permitted under an existing pact.189   
The depicted state sends a mystifying message to UGC platforms’ 
users.  Active UGC website participants are usually well informed and 
generally familiar with the existence of Second Level Agreements.  Such 
users normally understand that their infringing materials have not been 
removed pursuant to some copyright license acquired by the platform.  
Common unaware users, however, in a better scenario employ 
copyrighted materials believing that their infringement is not being 
detected or enforced, and in a worse scenario do not even realize that 
their actions may constitute copyright infringement.190   
In addition to the detrimental educational effect, the agreements’ 
opacity has further consequence.  Because Second Level Agreements do 
not involve users at any stage of the legal relationship, these pacts—
formally speaking—only protect the platform.  It is not clear, thus, what 
is the legal status of platforms’ users under these agreements.  Because a 
 
 189. MySpace Terms of Use Agreement follow the same path, in spite of their content deal 
with MTV: “MySpace respects the intellectual property of others, and requires that our users do the 
same.  You may not upload, embed, post, email, transmit or otherwise make available any material 
that infringes any copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other proprietary rights of any person 
or entity.”  Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 190. E.g., a question posted on YouTube’s Help Forum by a user named amydiane197831 on 
September 2009: “I tried to upload a video w/ Bette Midler’s song Wind Beneath My Wings and 
YouTube came back saying that I violated a copyright law with the song.  I can’t have a song on 
here by a famous artist that has a copyright.  BUT i see SEVERAL YOUTUBE USERS WITH 
VIDEOS WITH SONGS THAT HAVE COPYRIGHTS!  Some of them might’ve gotten permission 
by the record label, but not all of them had to.  I see that they give credit on their video to the artist.  
I could do that, but how do I do that??”  Help forum, YOUTUBE (Sept. 15, 2009), 
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=6d94739c48265476&hl=en.  See also 
a post on the same forum by missk on October 2009: “I don’t understand why it is okay for some 
users to post material from other sources (i.e. TV shows, films, etc.) and not others.  I will admit, I 
posted a show from another source [MTV-Viacom].  After a few days, my videos were taken down 
for copyright infringement, but there are other users with the same exact videos up and theirs are 
still there and have been for weeks.  If it is copyright infringement for me, should it not be for them? 
I seriously doubt any of them got permission from Viacom to post that material.”  Help forum, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=13ecbd1b27983fc0&hl=en.  See also 
post on YouTube Help forum by the user “djmambito”: “My video blocked . . . same video not 
blocked 1000 others (Shakira—Waka Waka).”  Help forum, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=737e8ba495e8d80d&hl=en.  Last, see 
a user complaint about YouTube’s allegedly “discriminating” removal policy, posted by the user 
missk: “Why is YouTube so inconsistent with their ‘so-called’ copyright infringement rules?”  Help 
forum, YOUTUBE (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=13ecbd1b27983fc0&hl=en.   
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claim of secondary liability cannot be established without direct 
infringement, the facilitator of the alleged infringing activity is immune 
from liability when the original user acts lawfully (e.g., pursuant to a 
license, in compliance with the fair use defense, etc.).  Second Level 
Agreements, however, involve a license granted to the facilitator of the 
infringing activity, which is not formally conveyed to direct users 
through the platform-users agreement.  Besides users’ inability to know 
the authorized boundaries of their actions, copyright owners could 
theoretically demand to retain the right to sue individuals for direct 
infringements.  In such case, it is unclear whether an exemption for a 
secondary infringer necessarily entails an exemption for the direct 
infringer.  Although platforms’ users would probably have a valid 
defense in cases of individual lawsuits,191 the absence of any formal 
indication of Second Level Agreements in the platforms’ terms of use 
leaves users in a legal status akin to the one they have under tolerated 
use—unknown, unstable, and uncertain.   
Second Level Agreements can also be criticized for hindering any 
potential illumination of current uncertainty surrounding a fair use 
analysis for uploaded UGC.  When applying fair use standards to UGC, 
as well as to any other use, the outcome may vary greatly due to the 
context-dependent character of this defense.192  As a result, it is 
complicated for legal counsels, and for unprofessional users all the more 
so, to determine whether a certain uploaded content amounts to fair use.  
The obscurity is greater in the UGC context as currently there is no case 
law analyzing fair use for cases of uploaded UGC.193  The field’s relative 
 
 191. See infra Section VIII.i and accompanying text.   
 192. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 377.   
 193. This refers to February 2011.  Most of the cases that scrutinized UGC uploads within the 
copyright sphere did so in the context of secondary liability.  In December 2009, EMI Music 
imprints Capitol, Caroline, Virgin, and EMI Music Publishing filed a suit against Vimeo.com, 
alleging that the site infringes the plaintiff’s copyrights by encouraging its users to post videos 
employing copyrighted music.  This suit also centers on “lip dubs,” homemade videos of fans lip-
synching various songs.  While the lawsuit is expected to revolve around secondary liability issues 
and DMCA safe harbors, it will also have to involve a decision as to whether “lip dubs” and similar 
mash-ups of amateur and professional content are infringing.  The case is still in a very initial stage.  
Complaint for Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, Inducement to Infringe 
Copyright, Misappropriation, and Unfair Competition, Capitol Records, LLC., v. Vimeo LLC., 
2009 WL 4918771 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009) (No. 09 CV 10101).  In Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008), Stephanie Lenz was sent a takedown notice for 
posting a home video of her toddler stumbling through her kitchen, then hearing and bobbing to 
Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy on YouTube.  Lenz then sent YouTube a DMCA counter-notification 
demanding that the video be re-posted because she claimed that the video constituted fair use of the 
song and, thus, did not infringe Universal’s copyright.  Lenz also brought suit against Universal, 
asking for a declaratory judgment that Lenz’s home constitutes fair use, as well as damages, and 
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immaturity is not the only explanation for this scarcity.  The liability 
discussion shifts to the platform’s liability rather than to individual 
liability also because copyright owners target the facilitators of the 
violations.  The basis for such lawsuits would usually be secondary 
liability, while fair use defense is attributed to a direct infringer.  This 
course prevents cases of uploaded UGC from being litigated, and does 
not allow any judicial guidelines as to the application of the fair use 
defense to be developed.   
Still, one could argue that Second Level Agreements enable users 
to avoid burdensome dilemmas as to the fairness of their use and save an 
unpleasant (and very costly) confrontation with powerful copyright 
holders.  This argument, however, disregards two attributes of Second 
Level Agreements—their non-inclusiveness and their potential 
vulnerability.  As previously demonstrated, Second Level Agreements 
are not inclusive for several reasons.194  When platforms sign Second 
Level Agreements, it usually would not include all the works owned by 
the contracting copyright owner.  The agreement may also refer only to 
some of the copyrighted elements of a work.195  Moreover, copyright 
owners usually retain the right to demand the removal of content in 
specific cases.  Consequently, an unknown amount of content is subject 
to pre-Second Level Agreements practice, i.e., tolerated use and DMCA 
procedure.   
The non-inclusiveness issue raises another concern.  So far, Second 
Level Agreements have involved contracting parties of certain 
characteristics only—top UGC platforms, major record labels, dominant 
media companies, etc.  These characteristics can be encapsulated in three 
words—big, popular, and powerful.  Aiming at minimizing transaction 
costs, economies of scale come once again into play.  Platforms’ owners 
are basically motivated to contract with big record labels, big media 
companies, and big copyright owners of all kinds.  In order to employ 
 
injunctive relief restraining Universal from bringing further copyright claims in connection with the 
video.  However, the court did not analyze Lenz’s use, and thus provided no guiding rules on the 
application of this defense to UGC upload.   
 194. See supra Section V.C.   
 195. The agreement between Google (YouTube) and Japan Rights Clearance Inc. exemplifies 
such a situation.  Because this agreement involves only the copyright of lyrics and music, YouTube 
users are allowed to post videos of themselves or their friends performing karaoke or doing a cover 
of a popular song.  They are not permitted, however, to deploy original sound recording or footage 
of a musical show on TV, because such acts would violate the copyrights of record companies and 
TV networks.  See Asahi Shimbun, Google to Pay Royalties to Japanese Firm for YouTube 
Uploads, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Mar. 27, 2008), 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/technologynews/view/337593/1/.html.   
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reasonable bargaining power to negotiate and execute such agreements 
without financially collapsing, the platform must be comparatively 
attractive.  The platform must be able to offer sufficient benefits (i.e., 
demonstrate high potential revenue) or represent a considerable threat 
(i.e., create opportunities for mass infringement), so that conglomerates 
would have an incentive to form content partnerships with it.  Hence, 
small copyright owners and small platforms are unlikely to engage in 
Second Level Agreements.  Because Second Level Agreements involve 
the big players only, the smaller players may justifiably fear that the 
practice will be reserved for the elites only, systematically reinforcing 
their power in the market.  While YouTube includes smaller content 
owners in its Partners Program,196 where it pays people with a history of 
successfully viewed videos, the difficulty remains, for this program isn’t 
tantamount to a Second Level Agreement.  YouTube Partners Program 
applies mainly to users-providers.197  Because YouTube does not allow 
other users to use copyrighted materials belonging to the partner, the 
Partner Program resembles an agreement with a premium content owner, 
which is aimed at offering content for consumption only.   
Apart from their non-inclusiveness, Second Level Agreements also 
suffer from a crucial vulnerability pertaining to their duration, as the 
YouTube-Warner pact demonstrates.  This agreement was about to 
expire two years after YouTube obtained the license.198  The parties had 
renegotiated for a while, but breakdown in talks led to the removal of the 
entire Warner catalog from the website, including many creative user-
generated videos.199  It was only nine months later that the parties 
managed to agree and bring Warner’s catalog back onto YouTube.200  
Chris Maxcy, Director of YouTube Partner Development, provided 
some information about the new deal in a blog post on YouTube Blog:  
“Under this new, multi-year global agreement, you will be able to 
discover, watch, and share Warner music on the site.  The partnership 
 
 196. Partners with YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/partners.   
 197. What is the YouTube Partner Program?, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=72851 (last visited on Nov. 
18, 2011) (emphasis added) (“Our Partnership Program is a revenue-sharing program that allows 
creators and producers of original content to earn money from their popular videos on YouTube”). 
 198. Peter Kafka, Warner Music Group Disappearing From YouTube: Both Sides Take Credit, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2008), http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20081220/warner-
music-group-disappearing-from-youtube-both-sides-take-credit/.   
 199. Id.  See also Greg Sandoval, YouTube users caught in Warner Music spat, CNET NEWS 
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10150588-93.html.   
 200. Eliot Van Buskirk, Warner’s Music Returns to YouTube Following Nine Month Hiatus, 
WIRED (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/09/warner-music-group-signs-
youtube-deal/#ixzz0n6jAWEAh.   
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covers the full Warner catalog and includes user-generated content 
containing WMG acts.”201  Nonetheless, it is not clear whether UGC 
incorporating Warner’s content is always allowed on YouTube, or if 
Warner retains the right to ask for the removal of videos at its discretion.  
Users’ discussions on various forums indicate that, regardless of 
YouTube’s license, Warner demands taking off UGC videos from time 
to time.202   
Second Level Agreements are in force for a specific period, which 
is determined by the parties, and not always disclosed.  Previous cases 
proved that neither renewing negotiations nor continuation of an old 
agreement are guaranteed.203  The reasons for not renewing an expired 
agreement can vary from lack of profitability or change in popularity, to 
a desire to equalize financial terms to those offered to other Second 
Level Agreements participants.  Renegotiating Second Level 
Agreements can also lead to changing their terms in accordance with 
market demands.  For example, a platform can choose to forego UGC 
and move into a premium content model, or to allow only pure 
reproductive UGC while forbidding derivative UGC.   
Second Level Agreements can also be criticized for changing the 
governing regime of copyright practice without offering users, who are 
materially affected by such agreements, or other affected players,204 any 
opportunity to debate or participate in this reform.  Acting as tools of 
self-regulation, contracts are the means by which the parties govern 
themselves, in a democratic way.205  Because this “law” binds only its 
makers, contractual relationship represents a democratic ideal of 
 
 201. Chris Maxcy, Warner Music Comes Back to YouTube, BROADCASTING OURSELVES ;) THE 
OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG (Sept. 29, 2009), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2009/09/warner-
music-comes-back-to-youtube.html.   
 202. For example, a thread on Ukulele Underground forum, Sebi, Posted Ukulele covers on 
YouTube being removed by Warner Music Group, UKELELE UNDERGROUND (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://www.ukuleleunderground.com/forum/showthread.php?25142-Ukulele-covers-on-Youtube-
being-removed-by-Warner-Music-Group; Spongeyday, Posted Who is WMG and why are they 
claiming certain songs to be “Unauthorized?”, YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=33696a3b74bf2bf3&hl=en.   
 203. For example, 600 videos by the members of the German collecting society (“GEMA”) 
were removed from YouTube after contract renewal talks broke down and were never renewed.  See 
Wolfgang Spahr, GEMA Talks with YouTube Break Down, BILLBOARD.BIZ (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3i327b3ab8972bdc8e06c3f112824ccce8.   
 204. Such as small UGC platforms that may have to enter Second Level Agreements to 
conform to industry standards.   
 205. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.2, at 7 (1982) (“[T]he terms of such direct bilateral 
exchanges are arrived at voluntarily . . . . Each party to an exchange seeks to maximize his own 
economic advantage on terms tolerable to the other party.”).   
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government, based on the consent of those governed by it.206 When this 
self-governance tool controls someone other than its makers, a troubling 
aspect arises.  These ‘laws’ are the product of private ordering, as 
opposed to a public democratic process.207  The contracting parties are 
akin to private legislatures, who impose significant rules without 
contemplating the broader public interest that informs democratic rule 
making.208  Although Second Level Agreements virtually dominate the 
practice of mass production, they do not follow democratic ideals, for 
users neither have an option to democratically influence this private law, 
nor they are fully aware of its content.  Not only does it mean that 
affected parties did not assent to existing Second Level Agreements, 
rendering them less legitimate, but it also implies that the interests of 
these effected parties may not have been considered or protected at all.  
As the motivation of UGC platforms has changed from maximizing 
users’ traffic to generating a shared revenue source based primarily on 
premium content, the economic interests of UGC platforms have moved 
closer to those of copyright owners and away from their users’ interests.  
Against this backdrop, there is a good reason to believe that while 
Second Level Agreements significantly influence many individual users, 
none of the parties have been concerned with the interests of these users.  
Hence, Second Level Agreements can be argued to inadequately protect 
the liberties and interests of other effected players.   
Another flow of Second Level Agreements is their reliance on 
filtering technology.  As previously described, a clear shift towards 
standardization of Second Level Agreements has occurred.  One 
expression of this standardization is the increasing use of content 
identification technology by UGC platforms.  Filtering technologies, 
however, have been widely criticized for being both under-inclusive by 
 
 206. Being common and impacting a vast amount of people, this model bears some 
resemblance to standard form contracts.  Standard forms contracts were often characterized as 
private lawmaking—“If by making law we mean imposing officially enforceable duties or creating 
or restricting officially enforceable rights, then automobile manufacturers make more warranty law 
in a day than most legislatures or courts make in a year.”  W. David Slawson, Standard Form 
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971).  See 
also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139-42 
(2006).   
 207. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 537 (1971).   
 208. For a broader discussion of cyberspace self governance, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
395 (2000) (critiquing claim that a self-governing cyberspace would more fully realize liberal 
democratic ideals).   
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failing to identify all unlawful content,209 and over-inclusive, by failing 
to appropriately accommodate fair use.210  Filtering systems are not 
equipped to produce the sort of balancing decisions called for by the fair 
use doctrine, as technology cannot apply itself to the qualitative 
character of a fair-use analysis, to contemplate external information into 
such analysis, or to appropriately handle the separable nature of mixed 
media (e.g., original video with copyrighted background music).211  This 
state raises several concerns.  First, transformative use of copyrighted 
content that is a key cultural fount for creative expression is expected to 
be impaired.  Such an outcome greatly contradicts the constitutional 
purpose of copyright law and harms free speech.  Second, conditioning 
content partnership with the implementation of identification 
technologies shifts the monitoring burden to UGC platforms.  This, 
again, confines the Second Level Agreements practice to major UGC 
platforms only, as smaller and less wealthy UGC platforms may not be 
able to follow suit due to the high costs associated with the deployment 
of a filtering system.212   
Content identification systems may also lead to “digital 
sharecropping,” in which the copyright owner enjoys licensing revenues 
on works that should not warrant it.213  When fair use is identified as 
infringement, the copyright owner choosing to monetize the use enjoys 
the fruits of the second author’s work, while the latter will be denied 
opportunities to obtain any of the revenue generated by her work.   
The need to submit copyrighted materials to the UGC platform, in 
order to ensure protection by their filtering systems, was also accused of 
creating a two-tiered copyright system—right owners that have the 
means and the willpower to “register” their works with the platform will 
enjoy copyright privileges, whereas those who fail to do so will receive 
no protection.214   
 
 209. E.g., Liz Gannes, Does Digital Fingerprinting Work?: An Investigative Report, 
NEWTEEVEE (June 8, 2007), http://newteevee.com/2007/06/08/does-digital-fingerprinting-work-an-
investigative-report/; Cory Doctorow, Why a Rights Robocop Will Never Work, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/oct/30/copyright.   
 210. See Sawyer, supra note 19, at 387.   
 211. Id.   
 212. For instance, YouTube and Google stated that their Content ID system is the result of 
“approximately 50,000 man hours of engineering time and millions of dollars of research and 
development costs.” Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).   
 213. See Sawyer, supra note 19, at 386.    
 214. Tony Bates, The Perils of YouTube Filtering: Part 1, MICHIGAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW BLOG (Dec. 1, 2007), http://blog.mttlr.org/2007/12/perils-of-
youtube-filtering.html#bateslink17.   
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Another disruptive consequence of content filtering involves the 
increasing proclivity to block automated identified content before it is 
publicly available.  While this was and still is the stated will of existing 
media companies,215 this course eliminates the power of the public to 
review the fairness of content removal, and protest when such removal 
was unjustified.  Previous cases demonstrate clearly that amiss removal 
of UGC provokes headlines.216  An example for such public reaction 
involves the removal of the “Downfall” parody videos from YouTube.  
“Downfall,” a German film portraying Hitler's last days, has been 
adopted for YouTube parodies featuring Hitler ranting in German to his 
staff, with modern subtitles covering various issues, from the mortgage 
meltdown and playing Xbox video games to Kanye West and Apple’s 
new iPad.217   
In April 2010, these clips, many of which had generated millions of 
views, began disappearing from YouTube as Constantin Films, the 
company that owns the rights to the “Downfall” film, asked for them to 
be removed.218  The removal of the “Downfall” videos engendered wide 
public disapproval in professional media, blogs, and users’ posts.219  The 
thunderous public attention to the removal immediately occasioned a 
response from YouTube, which submitted in a blog post that its Content 
ID system was designed to allow copyright owners to account for fair 
uses, and that “Rights holders are the only ones in a position to know 
 
 215. See Gannes, supra note 210 (“content owners said they wanted all content fingerprinted 
before it ever got posted.  ‘This was a religious point for some studios,’ said King.”).   
 216. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 392.   
 217. E.g., Hitler tries to solve the Gulf Oil Spill Crisis, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dc1623pWjwU; Hitler rants about the Hitler Parodies, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqqxRPZdfvs&feature=related; Hitler is informed 
Santa Claus doesn’t exist, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxXpF328r8w&feature=related.   
 218. Lewis Wallace, Hitler Downfall Videos Being Pulled from YouTube, WIRED (Apr. 20, 
2010), http://www.wired.com/underwire/2010/04/hitler-downfall-youtube-purge/.   
 219. E.g., MG Siegler, Hitler is Very Upset that Constantin Film is Taking Down Hitler 
Parodies, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/19/hitler-parody-
takedown/; Corynne McSherry, Everyone Who’s Made a Hitler Parody Video, Leave the Room, 
EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/everyone-who-s-
made-hitler-parody-leave-room; Jacqui Cheng, Attack on Hitler Parodies Now Newest Front in 
Copyright Wars, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/04/attack-on-hitler-parodies-now-newest-front-in-copyright-wars.ars; Mike 
Melanson, YouTube Weighs In on Hitler, Parodies, Mashups & Fair Use, READ WRITE WEB (Apr. 
22, 2010), 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/youtube_weighs_in_on_hitler_parodies_mashups_fair.php; 
Aaron Barnhart, Why The Take-Down of the 'Hitler' Parodies on YouTube was Illegal, TV WEEK 
(Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.tvweek.com/blogs/2010/04/why-the-take-down-of-the-hitler-parodies-
on-youtube-was-illegal.php.   
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what is and is not an authorized use of their content,” and YouTube 
“require(s) them to enforce their policies in a manner that complies with 
the law.”220  The public discussion also induced some users to challenge 
the removal through a DMCA counter notification.221  Had Constantin 
Films submitted the content to YouTube’s system earlier, and chose to 
block any match, there is a good chance none of these parodies, although 
some of them arguably qualify as fair use, would have appeared online.   
An additional shortcoming of requiring identification technology as 
a prerequisite for Second Level Agreements is that by doing so, 
platforms and copyright owners can greatly disrupt the DMCA 
takedown and counter-notification balance.222  When the filtering system 
automatically blocks matching content, copyright owners are no longer 
in need to send takedown notices to ask for the removal of infringing 
content.  Because a takedown notice was never filed, users cannot send a 
counter notification or sue the copyright owner, because they were not 
part of the removal process.  A suit against the platform can also be 
avoided easily through a contractual stipulation in the platform’s terms 
of service.  Most terms-of-use agreements state that the platform may 
remove any content at any time for any reason.223  Because there is no 
 
 220. Shenaz Zack, Content ID and Fair Use, BROADCASTING OURSELVES—THE OFFICIAL 
YOUTUBE BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2010/04/content-id-and-fair-
use.html.   
 221. E.g., Brad Templeton, Studio Does Content-ID Takedown of my Hitler Video About 
Takedowns, BRAD IDEAS (Apr. 20, 2010), http://ideas.4brad.com/studio-does-content-id-takedown-
my-hitler-video-about-takedowns (a user whose video has been removed writes in his personal blog 
that he filed a dispute over the Content ID takedown).   
 222. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 385.   
 223. See YouTube Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (“YouTube 
reserves the right to decide whether Content violates these Terms of Service for reasons other than 
copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscenity, or excessive length.  
YouTube may at any time, without prior notice and in its sole discretion, remove such Content 
and/or terminate a user’s account for submitting such material in violation of these Terms of 
Service.”); MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (“Furthermore, MySpace reserves the 
right, in its sole discretion, to reject, refuse to post or remove any posting (including, without 
limitation, private messages, emails and instant messages (collectively, ‘messages’)) by you, or to 
deny, restrict, suspend, or terminate your access to all or any part of the MySpace Services at any 
time, for any or no reason, with or without prior notice or explanation, and without liability.”); 
Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (“We can remove any content or information you post 
on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement.”); Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHOO!, 
http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (which govern also the use of Flickr and 
states “You acknowledge that Yahoo! may or may not pre-screen Content, but that Yahoo! and its 
designees shall have the right (but not the obligation) in their sole discretion to pre-screen, refuse, or 
remove any Content that is available via the Yahoo! Services.  Without limiting the foregoing, 
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statutory right to upload content, platforms operators and copyright 
owners can legally bypass the DMCA takedown procedure, thus leaving 
users with no recourse for over-filtering of lawful expression.   
Second Level Agreements can also be claimed to represent an 
undesired expression of what Professors Patricia Aufderheide and Peter 
Jaszi have dubbed the “clearance culture.”224  The clearance culture is 
“the shared set of expectations that all rights must always be cleared.”225  
In the copyright context, that is to say that users of copyrighted works 
often ask copyright owners to license or “clear” these works, even when 
the use is lawful.  The clearance culture is fostered by the inherent 
vagueness in many copyright concepts (chiefly fair use), and the high 
costs of litigation.  Incentivized by efforts to avoid litigation, many 
players in the copyright industries choose to take precessions in the form 
of voluntary agreements, which often restrict these players more than is 
required under copyright law.  Consequently, a conception of the 
copyright bundle as all-encompassing emerges, transaction costs are 
augmented, and speech is chilled.226   
The Veoh cases227 and the Viacom ruling228 indicate that while 
Second Level Agreements are legitimate business partnerships, they may 
not be required by copyright law.  Under the current regime, ISPs are not 
obliged to filter uploaded content.229  Google, for example, has always 
argued that it not only follows the letter of the law when it comes to its 
Safe Harbor obligations, but that it goes “well above and beyond what 
the law requires.”230  Yet, even though the law does not require ISPs to 
 
Yahoo! and its designees shall have the right to remove any Content that violates the TOS or is 
otherwise objectionable.”) (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
 224. Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Ctr. for Soc. Media, Untold Stories: Creative 
Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers 22, ACCIL (2004), 
http://www.acsil.org/resources/rights-clearances-1/nps240.tmp.pdf.   
 225. Id. at 22.   
 226. Id.   
 227. IO Grp. Inc. v. Veoh Networks. Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2008); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 228. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 229. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2004).   
 230. Eric Bangeman, Google Cites Safe Harbor, Fair Use in Viacom v. YouTube Defense, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 1, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/05/google-cites-safe-
harbor-fair-use-in-viacom-v-youtube-defense.ars; Greg Sandoval, Veoh Wins Copyright Case; 
YouTube Wins, Too?, CNET NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10352183-
93.html (“‘. . . the DMCA protects services like YouTube,’ Zahavah Levine, YouTube’s chief 
counsel said.  ‘With the DMCA, Congress intended to foster online platforms like YouTube, which 
empower users, offer new distribution channels for content owners, and respect copyright.’”);  
Miguel Helft, Google Takes Step on Video Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/business/16video.html?_r=1 (“Google has long insisted that 
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enter Second Level Agreements or implement an identification 
technology, the uncertainty surrounding their legal status causes risk-
averse players to do more.  Given that many analyses in copyright law 
involve examination of industry standards, the Second Level 
Agreements practice may end up as such standard.  Courts may 
disapprove UGC platforms that do not engage in Second Level 
Agreements, which in turn would generate over-deterrence and 
undermine the benefits and positive externalities of UGC.  Moreover, 
because the large industry players are usually those who enter Second 
Level Agreements, smaller UGC platforms may have to face a 
prohibitively large wall before enjoying a safe harbor status.   
The preceding review aimed at presenting the positive and negative 
aspects of Second Level Agreements in theory and in practice.  The 
following sections strive to set forth the legal and practical implications 
of the agreements, and to provide a normative assessment and a careful 
predication for their future in the burgeoning reality of the UGC 
revolution.   
VI.  LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS, NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT, 
AND CAREFUL PREDICTION 
A. Legal and Practical Implications  
The Second Level Agreements practice has become a common 
business model for UGC platforms and copyright owners, as well as the 
de-facto regime to determine production and consumption possibilities 
for end users in the Web 2.0 era.  To fully grasp the significance of the 
phenomenon and its potential implications, it is important to analyze it 
as a formal legal tool on the one hand, and as an informal norm on the 
other hand.   
Second Level Agreements are, first and foremost, contractual 
agreements between UGC platforms’ operators and copyright owners.  
They impose rights and obligations, which are specified in the 
contractual terms, on the contracting parties.  Although users are 
formally bound only by the platforms’ terms of service, these 
agreements do impact the users’ legal status.  While users who upload 
adaptations of preexisting works are technically considered infringers, 
 
YouTube has always operated in compliance with copyright law, in part because it takes down 
unauthorized copyrighted clips when asked to by content owners.”).   
43
Lev-Aretz: Second Level Agreements
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
8- LEVARETZ MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:30 AM 
180 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:137 
Second Level Agreements may provide them with two main defenses:  
an implied license claim or an estoppel argument.231   
In the leading case for implied copyright license, Effects Associates, 
Inc. v. Cohen,232 the court formulated a three-part test for the creation of 
an implied nonexclusive license.  An implied license would be found 
“when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work, (2) the 
creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the 
licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee 
copy and distribute his work.”233  Obviously users cannot pass this test 
based on Second Level Agreements practice, as an interaction between 
the licensee and licensor is missing.  Nonetheless, in Field v. Google, 
Inc., the court stated that an implied license may be found where the 
copyright owner’s conduct permits the other party to “properly infer” 
that the copyright owner has consented to the other party’s use.234  The 
court further held that a copyright holder’s consent does not have to be 
manifested verbally, and may be inferred even from silence if she knows 
of the use and encourages it.235   
The knowledge and encouragement test of Field can be useful in 
the hands of platforms users.  Whenever a copyright owner enters a 
Second Level Agreement, she cannot argue she wasn’t aware of the 
users’ use of her work, as the agreement was designed specifically to 
clear such uses.  Indeed, the clearance was intended to benefit the 
platforms, but that does not change the evident existence of the right 
holders’ knowledge.  As to the encouragement prong, users may argue 
that UGC platforms have always motivated users to upload materials, 
including copyrighted materials.  This encouragement is utterly lawful, 
from the platforms’ perspective, thanks to Second Level Agreements, 
and may be construed to attribute encouragement to the copyright 
 
 231. Additional defenses such as laches and copyright misuse (which is historically related to 
the doctrine of “unclean hands”) may also aid users when an infringement suit is brought against 
them.  A copyright defendant must prove two conjunctive elements to establish a laches defense: (1) 
the copyright owner inordinately delayed filing suit although she knew or should have known of the 
potential claim and (2) the delay resulted in undue prejudice to the alleged infringer.  See Kling v. 
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmty., Inc., 474 
F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007).  According to the copyright misuse doctrine, the copyright holder’s 
own conduct may disqualify her from making any copyright infringement claim during the period of 
misuse.  See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997); DSC 
Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th Cir. 1990).   
 232. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).   
 233. Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002).   
 234. Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006).   
 235. Id.   
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owners.  It is apparent, however, that Second Level Agreements do not 
perfectly satisfy the requirements for an implied license even under the 
broad Field’s test.  Yet, as one commentator put it, the implied license 
doctrine has always been used to insert some common sense into the 
dispute.236  Common sense would probably find a grant of a secondary 
license to the platform without an analogous implied license granted to 
its users to be preposterous.   
Users may also resort to an equitable estoppel defense.  Under 
copyright law, a copyright owner may be estopped from suing for 
copyright infringement if (1) the copyright holder knew of the facts of 
defendant’s infringing conduct, (2) either intended that defendant rely on 
his acts or omissions or acted or failed to act in such a manner that 
defendant had a right to believe it was intended to rely on plaintiff's 
conduct, (3) the defendant was ignorant of the true facts, and (4) relied 
on the copyright holder’s conduct to his detriment.237  If a copyright 
holder sues a user for her allegedly infringing use even though the use 
was covered under a valid Second Level Agreement, an estoppel 
argument would provide a strong defense.  Although the copyright 
holder may have not known the facts of the specific infringement, she 
gave her permission for similar acts under the agreement.  Users can also 
argue, justly, that it is reasonable to infer from the vast amount of 
copyrighted works, which are not being removed from the platform’s 
server, that the copyright owner has intended users to maintain the 
practice of uploading such materials.  Because informal and industry 
practices are often relevant to an estoppel analysis, a claim under this 
defense is even stronger.238    
The difficulty with the previous discussion is that it seems highly 
unlikely that a copyright owner would decide to pursue individual users 
for a use covered by a valid Second Level Agreement.  This is because, 
while formally granting immunity only to platforms’ owners, these 
agreements are based on clearing users’ uploads.  In reality, the 
agreements allow users to create and consume content in a way which 
otherwise would have been considered infringing.  Therefore, the 
 
 236. John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into Digital 
Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 898 (2007).   
 237. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).   
 238. E.g., Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 455 (5th Cir. 2003) (The court held that 
because the copyright holder had freely allowed fellow employees to use and modify his 
copyrighted worksheet, he was estopped from bringing a copyright infringement claim against 
defendant for using the worksheet); Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.   
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practical significance of Second Level Agreements goes way beyond 
their formal legal frame.   
In an oft-cited article from 1996, Robert Merges describes versions 
of private self-correction that turn into industry norms.239  Merges 
discusses the benefits of permitting parties to contract into organizations 
governed by liability rules, as a response to a deficiency in the formal 
specification of property rights.240  Second Level Agreements 
demonstrate Merges’ model in part because they were established as an 
alternative system to individual licensing.  Nonetheless, there is still a 
major difference, which is grounded in the agreements’ unique 
character.  Second Level Agreements can be classified as collective 
licenses because they are intended to allow the use of copyrighted works 
by many individual users.  Yet, as opposed to the examples brought in 
Merges’ work, the licenses are not granted to the users, but to a third 
party facilitator.  Having said that, Second Level Agreements exemplify 
the growth of a norm, which may eventually find its way into formal 
legal rules.  In the meantime, Second Level Agreements function as the 
main regulator of consumption and production by UGC platforms’ users.   
Second Level Agreements can also, to some extent, exemplify the 
three-dimensional model of property presented by Professor Abraham 
Bell and Professor Gideon Parchomovsky.241  Bell and Parchomovsky 
argue that property regimes will continue to develop to their optimal 
form mainly by reconfiguring assets or adjusting the owner’s panoply of 
rights.242  To demonstrate their account in the copyright context, Bell 
and Parchomovsky point, inter alia, to the record labels’ abandonment 
of the traditional distribution methods (e.g., the music album on vinyl, 
tape, or CD) in favor of music online on a pay-per-track basis.243  
Second Level Agreements have had a similar effect in terms of changing 
the distribution methods and utilizing the advantages of a third party 
distributor.  The practice also represents a response to what Bell and 
Parchomovsky referred to as “evolutionary pressure.”  A slight 
adjustment of the copyright owner’s right can be found in the unique 
legal arrangement offered by Second Level Agreements—the copyright 
owner sells a blanket license to the platform, for the benefit of its users, 
 
 239. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1361-62 (1996).   
 240. Id.   
 241. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access 
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77 (2009).   
 242. Id.   
 243. Id. at 93-94.   
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but the copyright owner still retains her veto right to ask the removal of 
the content, even after the use was made in accordance with the 
license.244  In other words, the copyright owner sells some of her rights, 
but still has the privilege of denying the license after it has been granted.   
Nonetheless, Second Level Agreements do not fit perfectly into the 
model as they neither typify a reconfiguration of the asset, nor do they 
involve a clear adjustment of the copyright holder’s right.  Instead of 
offering their works for free (e.g., tolerated use, choosing a creative 
commons licensing, etc.) or choosing to litigate, many copyright owners 
have decided on a middle ground approach.  This compromise 
demonstrates a change of the distribution method while the rights and 
the asset remain the same.   
B. Normative Assessment  
Second Level Agreements herald a new generation of free content 
business models, not only for consumption but also for production.  
Compared to an ideal copyright world, there are obviously too many 
shortcomings.  However, upon juxtaposing the flaws described above to 
the benefits the agreements bestow on the various parties, Second Level 
Agreements do more good than evil by promoting better information 
consumption, greater expression production, and broader infringement 
avoidance.   
That said, the legal regime created by Second Level Agreements 
could still be improved to offer more benefits and fewer drawbacks.  
Before discussing possible improvements, two comments are due.  First, 
many of the disadvantages discussed are grounded in the nature of 
copyright law, which is based primarily on property rules.  Under 
property rules “[n]o one can take the entitlement to private property 
from the holder unless the holder sells it willingly and at the price at 
which he [or she] subjectively values the property.”245  A copyright 
owner enjoys the ability to grant a license and demand any price she 
finds appropriate to compensate her for the use.  She can also, however, 
refuse to grant a permission to use her work.  Some of the setbacks of 
 
 244. This bears some resemblance to Glen O. Robinson’s model of unilateral use restrictions as 
covenants that run with the property.  The copyright owner succeeds in imposing post-transfer 
restrictions.  See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1480 
(2004).  The difference is that naming the copyright owner’s right to deny the use after the license is 
granted “a post transfer restriction” would be an understatement of the word “restriction.”  It is not a 
restriction but a complete, unpredicted denial or withdrawal.   
 245. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972).   
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Second Level Agreements, like non-inclusiveness and vulnerability, are 
products of this proprietary regime and would be present in any 
alternative, unless copyright owners no longer retain their veto right.   
Second, when judging the Second Level Agreements phenomenon, 
one should be mindful of the backdrop against which it has developed.  
The DMCA was criticized by many commentators for providing an 
inadequate solution for the challenges posed by the digital age.246  At 
least some of the criticism has proven to be right, as alternative ways of 
dealing with these challenges—such as Second Level Agreements—
have emerged.  Yet, Second Level Agreements represent a compromised 
stopgap, and thus cannot entirely alter the legal framework, or provide a 
comprehensive alternative to deficiencies in current copyright law.  One 
shouldn’t ask therefore whether this practice is perfect, but whether 
copyright owners, platforms, users, and society as a whole are better off 
under a Second Level Agreements regime.  As Second Level 
Agreements allow a new market of mass production to prosper, rather 
than being shut down due to market failures, I believe the answer is yes.   
Yet, Second Level Agreements can be revamped if some of their 
imperfections would be addressed.  Following the words of Justice Louis 
D. Brandeis—“Sunlight is the best disinfectant”247—alleviating the 
opacity would be a good start.  Besides scaling off the detrimental 
educational effect and the uncertainty surrounding the users’ legal status, 
transparency will also help to cure other flaws in the Second Level 
Agreements regime, as it will bring the pacts to the center of attention, 
and expose them to public criticism and even pressure in case an 
unjustified arrangement took place.  This can be done through a statutory 
requirement to fully disclose the terms of Second Level Agreements.  
Such a course, however, is at odds with freedom of contract because it 
imposes an unreasonable obligation on the contracting parties, especially 
when these parties are private corporations legitimately wishing to hide 
their business practices and trade secrets from the public eye.  It is also 
possible that the opacity of Second Level Agreements is a precondition 
for their existence as copyright owners wish not to grant any legal rights 
in their works to users.  While such a contention may have been viable at 
the emergence of the practice, it is not very likely to be true nowadays, 
as the practice itself has already altered the users’ legal status and will 
 
 246. E.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 673, 739-40 (2000); Urban & Quilter, supra note 96; Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 157 (2005/2006).   
 247. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).   
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keep doing so even more vigorously in the future as a rooted industry 
norm.   
Another alternative is to initiate a legal prerequisite for Second 
Level Agreements, which will require the contracting parties to provide 
a written statement as to the legal rights and obligations of users under 
the pact.  This statement would comprehensively describe the boundaries 
for users’ production as well as the users’ legal status.  The statement 
would also indicate the duration of the agreement and the legal state of 
users and their works in case the agreement won’t be renewed.  In 
addition, the parties would be obliged to publicly announce the details of 
this statement, and platforms would have to incorporate a link to such 
statements in their terms of use.  The power to enforce this obligation 
could be bestowed on the Copyright office, which upon receiving a 
complaint from a user, will be authorized to employ various sanctions, 
e.g., imposing fines.   
Due to the perceived shift towards standardization of Second Level 
Agreements and the increasing deployment of filtering technologies, the 
over-filtering problem must also be addressed to the extent possible.  
Indeed, the need to employ filtering technologies to make the process of 
identifying infringements is understandable.  Filtering systems protect 
UGC platforms and provide a workable environment for copyright 
owners, end users, and platforms’ operators.  Over-filtering, however, is 
an undesirable byproduct of this system which, as explained earlier, 
circumvents the DMCA counter-notification process.  Thus, while the 
use of identification technologies ought to be allowed, platforms must be 
required whenever a copyright owner asks for the removal of content in 
the case of a system-match, to allow users to oppose the removal 
through counter-notification.  YouTube already follows this model, and 
epitomizes a sincere attempt to compromise the need to employ filtering 
mechanism with users’ legal rights.   
Additionally, notwithstanding their merits, Second Level 
Agreements cannot and should not utterly substitute First Level 
Agreements.  The current state in which non-commercial licensing exists 
virtually is, only in theory, fundamentally wrong.  Users should be able 
to employ copyrighted work irrespective of a Second Level Agreement’s 
presence.  Second Level Agreements’ non-inclusiveness would have less 
severe implications if alternative individual licensing practices exist.  As 
I will demonstrate later, the shift towards premium content and reduction 
of derivative UGC reinforces the need for a non-commercial licensing 
regime.  A non-commercial licensing system would result in a win-win 
situation, in which users, copyright owners, and society as a whole 
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benefit; innovative users would be able to pay a reasonable price for 
using a copyrighted work, copyright owners would employ another 
revenue source, and the amount of creative expression would escalate.   
The previous discussion suggested that the practice of Second 
Level Agreements is overall desirable.  Nonetheless, the UGC market is 
faced with ongoing changes, which are expected to influence, inter alia, 
the practice of Second Level Agreements.  As demonstrated above, the 
practice has already gone through some changes when agreements 
became more standard, employing filtering technologies as an integral 
part of them.  The growing demand for premium content and the 
declining attractiveness of UGC for potential advertisers also implies a 
different Second Level Agreements practice in the future.  The latest 
court ruling in the case of Viacom v. Google may affect the practice of 
Second Level Agreements as well.  The move towards 
disintermediation, encouraged by the Internet, may likewise impact the 
future of UGC platforms and the Second Level Agreements practice.  
Also, the recent initiation of the first non-commercial licensing platform 
may herald additional developments of the non-commercial licensing 
scheme, and accordingly may impact the Second Level Agreements 
practice.  In the next and last section, I analyze these influential factors 
and provide a careful prediction as to the future of copyrights in the 
digital realm.   
C. The Future of Second Level Agreements248  
i) The Growing Demand for Premium Content 
When the first Second Level Agreements were signed, it seemed 
like a perfect arrangement—utilizing advertising revenue to enable users 
to upload copyrighted content.  As previously shown, however, UGC 
has become less attractive to advertisers, who seek “safe” premium 
content to attach to their ads.  Consequently, platforms have realized that 
in order to turn themselves into better revenue generators, they must 
 
 248. Another two factors that could influence the future of Second Level Agreements are the 
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 
2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) (also known as the Protect IP Act of 2011) (recommended to be 
considered by the whole Senate) and the Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(also known as SOPA) (introduced).  If passed, these acts could significantly impact UGC websites, 
as copyright infringement would become remarkably risky for end-users and service providers.  
These bills are still undergoing major changes and redrafting, and it is hard to determine the extent 
to which they alter the Second Level Agreements practice.  For this reason, this Article does not 
discuss their potential effects on the Second Level Agreements practice. 
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either enhance UGC residing on their servers with premium content, or 
adhere to the premium content model and refrain from hosting UGC.  
YouTube, for example, lost approximately $470 million in 2009 as the 
costs of bandwidth and storage far exceeded its revenue from 
advertising.249  Since then, YouTube has been trying to transform from 
an online clutter of amateur videos to a mainstream host of TV programs 
and movies by adding more premium content.250  While YouTube keeps 
demonstrating its obligation to the maintenance of UGC, few platforms 
could endure years of financial losses for the ideal of making their users 
happy.251  For this reason, some platforms turned from hosting UGC and 
premium content to offering merely the latter.  Other websites were 
initiated on the premium content model, and abandoned UGC uploads as 
a traffic generator under the belief that some advertisers are ambivalent 
to hosting advertising on a website alongside UGC.252   
The move towards premium content has already affected Second 
Level Agreements and is expected to maintain its influence in the future.  
Indeed, bandwidth costs as well as storage costs are declining.  From 
$270 in 1998, the cost of streaming a movie over the Internet dropped to 
merely five cents today.253  Still, as the rate of uploaded UGC has grown 
immensely in the past decade, the decreasing costs of storage and 
bandwidth are not necessarily reflected in practice to a full extent.  Thus, 
a business model that involves offering UGC along with premium 
content (akin to the YouTube model) can be proven unprofitable.  As 
one commentator put it, “imagine a store where you stock thousands of 
items, but only 5 percent of them are ever sold.  That’s YouTube.”254   
For the reasons described above, the move towards premium 
content is expected to continue.  A direct consequence would be 
 
 249. Stelter & Helft, supra note 146.   
 250. Greg Sterling, YouTube Moves: Google TV Ads And More Premium Content, Search 
Engine Land, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Apr. 17, 2009), http://searchengineland.com/youtubes-future-
tvads-and-more-premium-content-17723.   
 251. Eric E. Schmidt, Google’s chief executive, said in an interview that YouTube would 
continue to embrace user created content, even if it was not easy to earn revenue from it, because 
that content was essential to the popularity of the site.  See Stelter & Helft, supra note 146. 
 252. Greg Sandoval, Universal, YouTube near deal on music video site, CNET NEWS (Mar. 4, 
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10188600-93.html?tag=mncol;title.  See also VEVO,  
http://www.vevo.com/.  
 253. Dan Rayburn, Bandwidth Pricing Trends: Cost To Stream A Movie Today, Five Cents: In 
1998, $270, BUSINESS OF VIDEO.COM BLOG (Jan. 6, 2010), 
http://blog.streamingmedia.com/the_business_of_online_vi/2010/01/bandwidth-pricing-trends-cost-
to-stream-a-movie-today-five-cents-cost-in-1998-270.html.   
 254. R. Scott Raynovich, The YouTube Model is Dead, CONTENTINOPLE (July 4, 2009), 
available at http://www.webvideomarketing.org/fullarticle.html?id=1911 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011).  
51
Lev-Aretz: Second Level Agreements
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
8- LEVARETZ MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:30 AM 
188 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:137 
decreasing engagement in Second Level Agreements, as opposed to 
premium content partnerships, of major UGC platforms.  Because 
Second Level Agreements are sensitive to market changes, some of the 
current agreements would be terminated or modified to include premium 
content only.  Current UGC platforms may also turn into premium 
content platforms, thus leaving the UGC market in the hands of smaller 
websites.  So far, however, Second Level Agreements have been present 
only in major UGC platforms.  Unless this changes, a complete shift to 
premium content and the domination of the UGC market by smaller 
platforms would have a significant influence over the prospects of 
Second Level Agreements, and the amount of authorized UGC on the 
Internet.   
YouTube is currently the leading platform for UGC, and as long as 
it follows its statements to embrace user created content, UGC will stay 
around, along with the practice of Second Level Agreements.  While 
many have predicted the demise of the “You” in YouTube, based on the 
apparent shift towards premium content, so far none of them were 
right.255  Not only that, although advertisers favor premium content over 
UGC, there is still an ample demand among users for UGC platforms to 
share and communicate with others.  The market is expected to satisfy 
this demand by creating more UGC platforms and augmenting existing 
UGC networks.  Second Level Agreements, then, could be based on the 
ad share revenue model, depending on advertisers that wish to capitalize 
on the traffic on a website, irrespective of the content generating it.  
Alternatively, platforms and copyright owners may utilize royalty 
payments, although this course is unlikely to be sustainable with no 
revenue source for the platforms to justify the payment of royalties.  
Platforms could also profit from offering complementary goods, such as 
downloadable songs, t-shirts, DVDs, photos, concerts tickets, etc., and 
share the earnings with copyright owners as part of a Second Level 
Agreement.  Although difficult to implement after offering the 
platforms’ services for free, charging end-users for uploading their 
materials could also provide some revenue source for platforms, and 
may enable them to financially enter Second Level Agreements.   
Until a successful alternative to the ad revenue share model is 
found, the practice of Second Level Agreements is jeopardized.  Pending 
 
 255. E.g., id.; Sela, supra note 144; Chris Albrecht, Will Premium Content Kill the “You” in 
YouTube?, NEW TEEVEE (Mar. 30, 2009), http://newteevee.com/2009/03/30/will-premium-content-
kill-the-you-in-youtube/.   
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court’s rulings, however, may still allow it to flourish, as I show in the 
next section.   
ii) The Viacom Ruling 
Many interested parties closely watched the three-year-old legal 
battle between Viacom and YouTube, as it has pitted powerful 
Hollywood studios against equally dominant technology giants.  
Although the filing of the lawsuit has revealed the great tension between 
UGC platforms and media companies over copyrights, this tension has 
subsided substantially with time, due in large part to the rise of Second 
Level Agreements and the use of identification technologies to detect 
infringing content.  Because Viacom appealed the decision, it is 
important to consider the possible effects of both the current decision 
and a potential adverse ruling on the practice of Second Level 
Agreements.   
The holding in Viacom places the onus of policing copyright 
infringement squarely on the shoulders of copyright owners.  The court 
concluded that: 
If a service provider knows of specific instances of infringement, the 
provider must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the 
burden is on the owner to identify the infringement.  General 
knowledge that infringement is “ubiquitous” does not impose a duty on 
the service provider to monitor or search its service for 
infringements.256   
The decision means that UGC platforms are not legally required to 
develop filtering systems and would enjoy a safe harbor status as long as 
they took down content when copyright holders complained.  The Veoh 
appellate court recently echoed this approach, by holding that the 
DMCA did not impose investigative obligations on service providers.257      
The current decision dramatically improved the bargaining position 
of UGC platforms’ owners in negotiating Second Level Agreements.  
Before outlining the ramifications of this upgrade, it is important to 
distinguish small UGC platforms and small copyright owners from their 
major counterparts.  Small UGC platforms are only marginally affected 
by this ruling, which shields them from liability had they followed the 
court’s clear interpretation of the DMCA.  In practical terms, small 
 
 256. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis 
added).   
 257. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1015 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
53
Lev-Aretz: Second Level Agreements
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
8- LEVARETZ MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:30 AM 
190 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:137 
platforms would probably remain an unattractive contractual party for 
major copyright owners.  Thus, no Second Level Agreements are 
expected to appear as far as these platforms are involved.  Small 
copyright holders are even less affected by the ruling, as they have been 
virtually absent from the Second Level Agreements practice.  Except for 
monetizing their content in platforms that enable them to do so (what 
may sometimes qualify as Second Level Agreements), these copyright 
owners would continue to do what they have always done—monitor the 
Web and send takedown notifications, or tolerate the use.   
Conversely, major UGC platforms and powerful content owners 
would be greatly affected by the outcome of this case.  While the current 
ruling is expected to encourage copyright owners to replace constant 
monitoring of UGC platforms for infringing content with content 
partnerships, the demands for the latter would probably increase.  If the 
decision were to be reversed on appeal, the same effect is presumed on 
copyright holders; UGC platforms would have a stronger motivation to 
enter content partnerships while copyright owners are likely to augment 
their demands.  If the current ruling will be upheld on appeal, the pivotal 
question would be whether UGC platforms insist on getting more than 
right holders agree to grant, which in turn may cause negotiation 
breakdown and threaten the Second Level Agreements practice.  It is 
more likely, however, that such a scenario would not take place for 
several reasons.  First, the current Viacom ruling is subject to appellate 
review and may be overturned.  UGC platforms and content owners are 
aware of this fact and will not dramatically change their strategies until a 
final judgment is delivered.  Second, even if the ruling is affirmed on 
appeal, it is in the interest of both parties to work in tandem because they 
stand to gain from a content partnership.  UGC platforms could utilize 
copyrighted materials to increase traffic on their websites, offer creative 
users informal permission to use copyrighted content in their works, and 
employ premium content to attract advertisers and increase revenues.  
Also, given the importance of hosting copyrighted materials to their 
prosperity, UGC platforms have always been keen to maintaining a good 
relationship with content owners.258  As previously discussed, copyright 
owners are also better off under a valid Second Level Agreement, which 
allows them to save enforcement costs and to enjoy the platforms’ 
marketing potential.  Because Second Level Agreements enable UGC 
 
 258. One of the problems with the Viacom case is that to a large extent it addressed past 
conduct—Viacom sought damages only for actions taking place before YouTube implemented its 
content ID in early 2008.  As discussed above, the conditions of the market have tremendously 
changed since three years ago with the rise of Second Level Agreements and content partnerships.   
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platforms and copyright holders to retain the advantages as described, 
they are facially expected to maintain it.   
iii) Disintermediation 
The development of the Internet has been shown to shorten 
processes and eliminate intermediaries.259  This disintermediation has 
not skipped the media companies, which have often chosen to launch 
their own platform for distribution instead of partnering with existing 
platforms.  Hulu, a web-based commercial-supported site, which 
operates cooperatively with NBC Universal and a number of other major 
American networks, follows this model.260  Another relatively new 
example is Vevo, a premium content portal owned by Universal Music 
Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and the Abu Dhabi Media 
Company.261  The disintermediation move could impact UGC practice 
too, as powerful content owners may start employing their own 
technologies to monitor the Web and send automated takedown notices 
in case a match is found.  Additionally, they could establish distribution 
platforms for their premium content to attract Internet users from current 
UGC and premium content platforms.  Such development could be 
destructive to UGC platforms and possibly bring the Second Level 
Agreements practice to an end.   
Yet, a complete disintermediation is unlikely to occur as several 
current indications imply.  Above all, history proves that technology has 
always preceded industry practice and business models, which had to be 
adjusted duly.  For this reason, platforms owned and operated by tech-
savvy intermediaries are still dominant and would probably continue to 
prevail.262  Even if copyright owners would manage to acquire 
technology to effectively monitor the Web and send takedown notices, 
such technology would expose them to liability for misrepresentation 
under §512(f) of the DMCA.  §512(f) was intended to provide an 
economic disincentive to remove non-infringing material.263  When a 
 
 259. Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 397 (2009).   
 260. HULU, http://www.hulu.com.   
 261. Although the video hosting for Vevo is provided by YouTube, with Google and Vevo 
sharing the advertising revenue.   
 262. See, for example, current talks about Google’s plan to launch a music service to compete 
with Apple’s iTunes store.  Scott Morrison, Google Plans Music Service Tied to Search Engine, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 21, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704895204575321560516305040.html.   
 263. Charles W. Hazelwood, Jr., Fair Use and the Takedown/Put back Provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 50 IDEA 307, 316 (2010).   
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copyright owner sends a takedown notice, “knowingly materially 
misrepresents” that the content in question infringes her copyright, the 
alleged infringer has a claim for damages incurred and may seek 
monetary relief.264  One court recently concluded that under the DMCA, 
copyright owners must consider the fair use doctrine in determining 
whether to issue a takedown notice.265  As opposed to the current 
operation of filtering systems, which bypasses this DMCA obligation by 
removing the content automatically prior to its upload, technology 
employed by content owners without platforms’ cooperation would 
involve regular DMCA procedure, and thus would have to comply with 
the requirements set forth in §512(f).  As I explained earlier, although 
technical approximations provide some degree of certainty, they are not 
capable of identifying all fair uses.  Copyright owners are therefore 
expected to face a serious dilemma if they choose to employ such 
technologies without the platforms’ safeguarding hand.   
Another reason for copyright owners and UGC platforms not to 
part ways has to do with the popularity of UGC among both users-
providers and users-consumers.  Users demand to post and consume 
amateur content, and they vote with their feet.266  Studies that analyzed 
UGC platforms’ popularity found that UGC allows users to attain three 
groups of needs virtually all together:  (a) self-expression and self-
actualization, (b) social interaction and community development, and (c) 
information and entertainment.267  The importance of fulfilling many 
needs in one convenient location has created a high demand for UGC 
networks.  While copyright owners can provide the need for information 
and entertainment, the combination of satisfying users’ informational 
wants, providing entertainment (not only premium entertainment), and 
enabling social connections requires more than a premium content 
platform.  UGC, thus, seems to call for cooperation between content 
owners and platforms to maintain its appealing qualities.   
 
 264. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).   
 265. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 266. UGC videos keep generating the largest number of views.  See, e.g., Relaxnews, 
YouTube’s most-watched videos of the week, THE INDEPENDENT (May 21, 2010), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/youtubes-mostwatched-videos-of-the-week-
1979790.html (listing the ten most viewed YouTube videos for that week, from which eight were 
user-created videos).   
 267. Guosong Shao, Understanding the appeal of user-generated media: a uses and 
gratification perspective, 19 INTERNET RESEARCH 1, 7 (2009).  See also Ivan B. Dylko, What is 
Politics-Oriented UGC?, TECH, MEDIA AND POLITICS BLOG (May 13, 2009), 
http://ivandylko.blogspot.com/2009/05/what-is-politics-oriented-ugc.html.   
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A relatively new form of intermediation, however, threatens the 
Second Level Agreements practice.  After preforming successfully in the 
UK, a digital rights management company, Base 79 (previously—“My 
Video Rights”),268 sought to bring its model to the U.S. market, and 
started offering technology to monitor unauthorized usage of 
copyrighted materials in web videos.269  When a copyright infringement 
is found through the monitoring technology, the copyright owner may 
earn income from the infringement in the form of advertising, which is 
then placed next to the infringing video.270  While the technology 
resembles YouTube’s Content ID system, unlike this system, this 
business model leaves UGC platforms out of the game and takes ad 
revenue away from them.271  The choice to monitor the web 
independently discourages right holders from entering Second Level 
Agreements in their current form, as it provides a monetization 
alternative for the entire web and does not require individual negotiation 
with each platform.  Also, as long as independent monitoring results in 
monetization, as oppose to removal, of infringing content, rightholders 
are shielded from liability under §512(f) of the DMCA.  Consequently, 
independent monitoring may be a game changer for the Second Level 
Agreements regime.     
iv) Non-Commercial Licensing Practice272 
As mentioned before, in the absence of a Second Level Agreement, 
a user-provider wishing to make a derivative use of a work has basically 
four options—avoiding the use because the copyright owner would 
probably demand its removal; using the work in compliance with the fair 
use doctrine; taking more than the fair use doctrine allows and hoping 
the copyright owner tolerates the use; or obtaining permission for 
 
 268. Base 79, BASE 79, http://www.base79.com/#!home. 
 269. James Careless, MyVideoRights Thinks Big as it Expands Into the U.S., STREAMING 
MEDIA MAGAZINE (April/May 2011), 
http://www.streamingmedia.com/Articles/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=74798&utm_source=feedbur
ner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+StreamingMediaMagazine-
FeaturedArticles+(StreamingMedia.com:+Featured+Articles) (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
 270. Id.  
 271. My Video Rights’ Chief Operating Officer, Ron Schneier, describes the process: “For 
instance, rather than remove a popular clip from YouTube so that no one can see it, we replace it 
with a higher quality version that provides a better viewing experience and makes money from 
advertising, i.e., through a short commercial preroll before the content is shown or a midroll of ads 
during the content itself.” Id.  
 272. This section is based on a work by the author of this article—Yafit Lev-Aretz, Towards a 
Non-Commercial Licensing Practice (on file with the author).   
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employing the copyrighted content.  To be on the safe side, the user has 
to choose between refraining from using the copyrighted work, or 
obtaining a license from the copyright holder.  Although copyright law 
aims at encouraging the second choice, so that creation of new 
expressions would expand, in practice users are markedly discouraged 
from taking that path.   
A user-producer’s journey towards acquiring a license starts with 
identifying the copyright holder.  While the Internet made such a quest 
much easier, in some cases it is still not at all simple, especially when 
the copyrighted work is not a popular one.  If the user succeeds in 
identifying the copyright owner, she would have to contact the owner to 
negotiate a license.  All these actions are time-consuming and may 
involve expenditure on top of the license’s costs, which may render the 
transaction inefficient to complete.273  Moreover, since currently there is 
no common practice of licensing for non-commercial purposes, a user is 
usually required to pay a pricy licensing fee, which she cannot afford as 
a private user.274  The difficulty is greater when the requested license is 
for the use of a popular work.275  Previous cases demonstrated that the 
copyright industries have been reluctant to provide no-cost or reduced-
price licenses for non-profit and non-commercial uses.276  As Professor 
Neil Netanel pointed out, this state makes perfect economic sense for the 
 
 273. For example, see the following question asked by a YouTube user on the YouTube Help 
forum: 
I wanted to make a video to accompany a piece of music . . . soon after uploading the 
video I was informed that the audio would be disabled because I had violated 
copyrighted material from ‘WMG’ . . . The disabling of the music made the video 
nonsensical . . . So, I finally decided to do something about it by finding out who had the 
rights to the song and legally get permission . . . I searched for a couple of days and 
came up empty handed . . . The next logical step was using the ‘Contact Us’ portion of 
the Warner Music Group website . . . Now each time I wanted to contact them I had to 
fill in a form—I did this quite a number of times over a two-month period and never 
received a response.  I came across a site that said it would contact people on your behalf 
to get rights to use music, movies, etc., and give you a quote for the cost so you could 
legally get the rights . . . So I regularly contacted this company over a two-month period 
again having to fill in a form each time—and I never received a response.  So I have hit a 
brick wall and would like to know what the next logical step would be in trying to get 
permission to use this song?  Or, at the very least, a response from a human? 
Vercingetorix, Posted How to Gain Copyright Permission?, YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (Aug. 16, 
2009), http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=48e112ea6309599c&hl=en.   
 274. Gervais, supra note 4, at 848.   
 275. Michal Shur-Ofry, Popularity as a Factor in Copyright Law, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 525, 
549-52 (2010) (describing the potentials of market failure in the process of licensing popular 
works).   
 276. Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 79 (2003).   
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copyright industry firm, as “at some point the costs of setting and 
administering differential pricing outweigh the revenues the firm can 
expect to reap from such a regime.”277   
Still, the demand for a non-commercial licensing system keeps 
growing.  Online forums are saturated with users’ posts concerning the 
same issue—an obtainment of a license to use a copyrighted work.278  
While Second Level Agreements have considerably promoted the needs 
of users-providers, as users become more productive and their works 
gain more popularity, the agreements’ non-inclusiveness becomes a 
major hurdle.  Although quite belatedly, companies have started to 
recognize this demand and the first non-commercial licensing 
mechanism was launched recently.  The initiative came from Google’s 
YouTube and Music licensing store RumbleFish, which announced the 
launch of Friendly Music, an online store designed to help users find 
appropriate soundtrack music for their videos.279  The service offers 
users to purchase a perpetual synchronization license to a copyrighted 
song for $1.99.  Under the license, users are allowed to use the song as 
part of the audio track of one video that they may upload to UGC 
networks for non-commercial purposes only.280  The license agreement 
requires users not to get paid for making the video, not to charge anyone 
for watching it, and not to receive revenue from advertising or other 
sources.281   
Friendly Music is merely a start and is still far from fulfilling the 
current demand for non-commercial licenses.  Nevertheless, Friendly 
Music marks the first time users-providers, acting within a mass creation 
platform, enjoy the option to obtain a direct non-commercial license 
without UGC platforms’ involvement.  Prior to the inception of the 
Second Level Agreements practice, users-providers could not legally 
acquire a license and had to either avoid using the copyrighted work or 
turn the use into a commercial one so they would be able to negotiate 
 
 277. Id.   
 278. E.g., the aforementioned “Vercingetorix” post.  Vercingetorix, supra note 273.  See also 
Ron, Posted How do you get permission to use copyrighted material?, YAHOO (June 2, 2010), 
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100503054515AALTElx; Cheeky0Little0Gamer, 
Posted how do i get permission to use a song in my video? Ive got the cd!, GOOGLE (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=2408bf1732b89c01&hl=en.   
 279. FRIENDLY MUSIC, http://www.friendlymusic.com.   
 280. Friendly Music License Agreement, FRIENDLY MUSIC, 
http://www.friendlymusic.com/docs/friendly-music-license-agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011).   
 281. Other than UGC platform’s ad share revenue on the video portion of the work.  In case 
users wish to employ the music for commercial purposes, they would have the option to contact the 
service and negotiate an additional license fee.  See id.   
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and pay the expensive license fee.  Under Second Level Agreements, 
users-providers were able to create more freely, but still pursuant to an 
indirect license, unknown terms, and full dependence on the copyright 
holders’ will.  A non-commercial licensing practice takes this state to the 
next level by enabling creative users to acquire a direct license, with 
fully disclosed terms and little room for surprises.   
The truly interesting question would be to what extent, if at all, this 
practice would affect Second Level Agreements.  From the right 
holders’ perspective, it all comes down to the profitability of each 
model.  The non-commercial licensing model is likely to be less 
successful, at least in its first years.  Making popular works available for 
non-commercial licensing, demanding users to pay for such use after 
enjoying it for free for many years now, offering a non-commercial 
licensing mechanism in other UGC fields, and creating a more appealing 
licensing structure that allows users to apply more creative changes to 
the original work—all are developments that entail time and 
expenditures.  If a non-commercial licensing system would manage to 
overcome the aforementioned difficulties, it would offer copyright 
owners a more comprehensive scheme for charging users, without 
subjecting the charge to the interests of other players (e.g., UGC 
platforms and advertisers).  Until then, however, Second Level 
Agreements are expected to remain the favored licensing option for 
copyright holders.   
For creative users, Second Level Agreements, regardless of their 
vulnerability and non-inclusiveness, make more economical sense.  As 
opposed to the iTunes model which offered a reasonably priced 
alternative to the illegal conduct of file sharing, a non-commercial 
licensing system would have to compete with legitimate licenses, which 
on top of being lawfully made are completely free.  The free license 
alternative leaves little incentive for users to engage in a non-
commercial licensing practice.  Also, ironically, Second Level 
Agreements in their current form are better for creative users because 
these pacts allow creation without imposing preliminary restrictions.  As 
long as Second Level Agreements continue to offer users a 
complimentary, restrictions-free license, non-commercial licenses will 
operate as a form of insurance.  When a user purchases a non-
commercial license, she can be certain that her work is legally produced 
and distributed, thus not conditional on right holders’ caprices.  Still, it 
seems that for the vast majority of users, the benefit of this insurance 
exceeds its price.  Users are expected to be risk seeking because they 
only risk the presence of their work on the platform, which can be easily 
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restored through a non-commercial license in case the copyright owner 
demands its removal.  Until Second Level Agreements cease to afford a 
better alternative for most users, the relatively low number of risk averse 
users who would choose to pay for a formal license as insurance is 
unlikely to maintain sufficient demand to keep non-commercial 
licensing thriving.   
It is hard to determine whether a non-commercial licensing system 
would better survive in copyright practice than Second Level 
Agreements.  In the only current form of the non-commercial licensing 
system, one dominant UGC platform actively participated in establishing 
the system.  Thus, this platform is expected to actively promote itself 
among its users.  When a user obtains a non-commercial license, she 
also immunizes the platform from secondary liability, because the user 
has the legal right to post the content.  In such case, the platform can 
stipulate in its terms of service that it reserves the right to attach 
advertisements to users’ works.282  Shifting the licensing burden to users 
would also release platforms owners from including derivative UGC in 
Second Level Agreements, thus making the agreements more beneficial 
and presumably less expensive for the platforms.  Because UGC has 
already proven itself as a poor interest for advertisers, platform operators 
are better off without bearing financial and legal responsibility for 
licensing such uses.   
Non-commercial licensing also opens the market for another kind 
of intermediary, which may eat into the current UGC platform’s scope of 
operation.  However, Friendly Music’s business model implies that 
Second Level Agreements may end up incorporating non-commercial 
licensing systems, which will be operated by the platforms themselves.  
It is still for the platforms to resolve how an automated filtering system 
could automatically distinguish between premium content, which may or 
may not be covered under content partnership, and authorized derivative 
UGC pursuant to a non-commercial license.   
In light of this analysis, one has to give thought to two important 
points.  First, if built appropriately, a non-commercial licensing scheme 
is the ideal way of operating in the copyright market.  A direct, clear, 
and certain license provides better and more efficient creation 
opportunities, and thus promotes the underpinning of copyright law.  
Second, the current non-commercial licensing attempt has sprung from a 
market demand, which kept growing, notwithstanding the presence of 
Second Level Agreements.  This makes perfect sense when 
 
 282. Although this may conflict with the “non-commercial” requirement of the license.   
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understanding the grounds on which Second Level Agreements 
emerged—a sudden reality of mass creation and user-supplied content, 
statutory safe harbors for UGC platforms, and lack of a feasible way to 
charge users for their employment of copyrighted works.  Against this 
backdrop, it almost appears as though Second Level Agreements were 
the only quick and efficient substitute for a non-commercial license that 
the market could come up with.  Therefore, non-commercial licensing is 
expected to develop and naturally undermine its antecedent, although 
such subversion will take time to complete.  In the meanwhile, Second 
Level Agreements and non-commercial licensing are expected to overlap 
until finding the appropriate allocation.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Second Level Agreements have changed the landscape of copyright 
practice.  Formally, Second Level Agreements are meant to limit the 
potential liability of UGC platform operators, while having no direct 
bearing on the legal status of end users.  In practice, however, Second 
Level Agreements have dramatically affected the rights and privileges of 
end users.  Effectively, they have dramatically expanded consumption 
and use possibilities, and have afforded users far greater access and use 
privileges with respect to copyrighted content relative to what they 
previously had.  Hence, it will not be an exaggeration to say that in terms 
of practical significance, Second Level Agreements are far more 
important than fair use and tolerated use.   
Second Level Agreements are ubiquitous, especially among large 
UGC platforms.  Websites, such as YouTube, MySpace, and Yahoo, to 
name just a few, have all entered Second Level Agreements with 
powerful right holders, such as the big four U.S. record labels, Viacom, 
Disney, and others.  As a result, Second Level Agreements redefined not 
only the legal rights and duties of the contracting parties, but also the 
prevailing norms and industry practices, which regulate the creation and 
distribution of UGC.   
The goal in this article was to provide a first comprehensive study 
of the Second Level Agreements phenomenon.  Descriptively, it presents 
a detailed account of the emergence of Second Level Agreements as 
well as their effects.  Normatively, it evaluates the vices and virtues of 
Second Level Agreements.  It also offers a prediction as to the future of 
Second Level Agreements.   
Despite the immense practical significance of Second Level 
Agreements and the theoretical challenges they raise, legal scholarship 
has not provided a thorough analysis of their regime.  This article 
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attempts to redress this omission.  It is my hope that this study will 
constitute a useful first step for future research on the subject.   
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